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201. Colonizing Kashmir: An interview with Hafsa Kanjwal

Author:
Mahia Bashir and Hafsa Kanjwal
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Joining a new wave of critical scholarship on global decolonization, Hafsa Kanjwal’s 2023 monograph Colonizing Kashmir: State-building Under Indian Occupation(Stanford University Press) offers a compelling and provocative account of Indian state-building in Kashmir in the aftermath of the British withdrawal and argues that independent India’s attempts at state-building in Kashmir were fundamentally colonial. In recasting the Indian national project in Kashmir as a colonial enterprise and highlighting the role of Kashmir’s client regimes in this process, Kanjwal lays bare the “politics of life” that was central to bringing Kashmir within the Indian national orbit without the popular consent of its people. Ultimately, this account offers a critique of the liberatory character of narratives around decolonization and offers an alternative lens to understand national consolidation in the aftermath of the second World War.
Topic:
History, Decolonization, Interview, and Colonization
Political Geography:
South Asia and Kashmir

202. The Yemen Annual Review 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

203. The Yemen Review Quarterly: January-March 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Yemen’s political and economic situation worsened in the first months of the year as the impacts of the Red Sea crisis, which began in November, began to manifest themselves. Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) were effectively placed on hold, and the United States broadened its response to the Houthi attacks, launching strikes alongside the UK against Houthi targets inside Yemen and designating the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SDGT), which came into effect on February 16. The designation could impact not only Houthi military and economic activities but also risks a further stranglehold on international humanitarian work in Houthi-run territories, as banks and exchange firms stop dealing with Sana’a-based entities. In late March, Houthi authorities issued a 100-rial coin to replace dilapidated notes, escalating the economic warfare between the two rival central banks. Denouncing the move as illegal, the Aden central bank branch prohibited the coins’ circulation, but the real fear is that this is a trial balloon for a series of currency roll-outs that will end with Sana’a printing its own banknotes, possibly with foreign help, as rebel authorities did in Libya in 2019. Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed finally stepped down, succeeded by Foreign Minister Ahmed Awadh bin Mubarak on February 5. Yemen’s ambassador in Riyadh, Shaya al-Zindani, was belatedly appointed to the vacant foreign minister post on March 26. Neither man is popular with the PLC. Combined with the government’s strained finances, this could hamper their effectiveness. Houthi attacks on foreign shipping and US-UK attacks continued more or less unabated, causing in one case the sinking of a ship carrying fertilizer and diesel fuel. US-UK airstrikes have killed at least 37 on the Houthi side, and reportedly some Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers. After talks with Omani officials in Muscat in early April, the US Yemen envoy appeared to hold out hope of a resolution, suggesting the sanctions would be lifted if the attacks stopped – as tensions rose again between Iran and Israel, with possible implications for Yemen. Tensions also rose on frontlines inside Yemen as Houthi and government-aligned forces reinforced their military presence in several areas, including Hudaydah and Marib. The US-UK strikes also heightened the repressive atmosphere in Sana’a and elsewhere, as Houthi authorities cracked down in areas near mobile launch sites and introduced a new law against support for Israel that is already being used as another cudgel to crush dissent. Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch announced the loss of its leader Khaled Batarfi in March, who died after several months of illness. He was replaced by Saad al-Awlaqi, a senior Yemeni figure with strong tribal ties in Shabwa who is popular among younger members of the group but whose ties with Iran-based Saif al-Adel, the de facto leader of the global organization, appear to be tense. Al-Qaeda also lost Saif al-Adel’s son, known as Ibn al-Madani, reportedly as a result of a fire in the place where he was staying in Marib, and the group’s lead drone expert Khaled al-Sana’ani also died in an apparent traffic incident – incidents that have raised speculation of possible internal skulduggery as Al-Awlaqi settles into his new role.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

204. The Yemen Review Quarterly: April-June 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Houthi intelligence arrested dozens of local and international aid workers and UN and non-government organization (NGO) staff in early June, alleging they were part of a US-Israeli conspiracy to undermine Yemeni society. The detainees were paraded on television and forced to give scripted confessions. The Houthis seem to have targeted monitoring and evaluation workers, perhaps to better control information on the economic and humanitarian situation. While the group continues to enjoy public support for its Red Sea attacks, pressure has been mounting over unpaid salaries, a deteriorating economic situation, and new banking restrictions. The detentions likely serve both to intimidate and to afford leverage vis-à-vis international institutions: a week before the arrests, 44 people were sentenced to death on similar charges of espionage.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Economy, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

205. The Yemen Review Quarterly: July-September 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On July 19, a Houthi drone reached Tel Aviv, killing one person and wounding ten, the first time the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) has inflicted casualties in an attack against Israel. Israel responded the next day with airstrikes on the port of Hudaydah, destroying infrastructure and fuel stores and killing six workers. Dozens of others were hospitalized with severe burns. The Houthis unsuccessfully targeted Tel Aviv again on September 15, and Israel undertook further airstrikes on port and power facilities in Hudaydah governorate two weeks later, killing four and injuring 40. There is concern that the strikes will interrupt the flow of humanitarian aid through Hudaydah and that the loss of fuel reserves could lead to shortages in Houthi-held areas.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Natural Disasters, Economy, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Red Sea

206. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:
Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, and Asia

207. The Future of U.S.-Turkish Ties: A New Relationship, Not a Reset

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Despite the welcome news on Sweden, the old Turkey is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift to legacy-building mode will give Washington opportunities to leverage his influence abroad. On January 23, Turkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s accession to NATO, opening the path for Stockholm’s eventual membership in the alliance. The Biden administration attaches great importance to NATO expansion amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and while the Swedish membership bid must still await a vote by Hungary’s parliament, Turkey’s decision is a major step forward. Previously, Ankara had held off greenlighting Stockholm’s application for nearly two years after it was submitted in May 2022, and the issue became symbolic of deeper dysfunction in U.S.-Turkish ties. This week’s parliamentary vote promises to end that epoch, giving both Washington and Ankara an opportunity to chart a new course even as other differences persist.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

208. Beijing’s Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The real threat to U.S. interests in the region isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of Washington's influence. Will China broker a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? It is a question nobody is asking, because the answer is obvious—not a chance. Yet after Beijing hosted Iran-Saudi talks that led those two rivals to re-establish diplomatic relations in March 2023, some observers wondered if China had supplanted the U.S. as the Middle East’s diplomatic broker. Since Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, China has put such illusions to rest: its conduct shows that it is less interested in the success of its own initiatives than in the failure of Washington’s. The real threat to U.S. interests in the Mideast isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of our own...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

209. The Impact of the War in Gaza on Israel-Jordan Cooperation

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Gaza war’s impact on Jordan has been significant and at times uncontrolled, with a primary focus on demands to halt all forms of “bilateral cooperation” with Israel. However, the implementation of the energy for water project is likely only a matter of time, although contingent on cessation of hostilities. The war in Gaza has cast a dark shadow over the promising water and energy cooperation projects between Jordan and Israel. Water and energy are among the most economically and politically sensitive sectors in contemporary Jordan due to the country’s chronic water shortage and the difficulty of securing energy sources for local use. Jordan imports more than 96 percent of its energy needs, with an annual import bill exceeding $3 billion, according to official statistics. The Gaza war has had a direct impact on Jordanian public opinion, with increasing demands that the country withdraws from all its commitments, treaties, and agreements with Israel and halt all forms of cooperation. So far, however, it appears these demands have disrupted only one project, Project Prosperity—or energy for water agreement—which is sponsored by the United Arab Emirates with U.S. approval. Although the project has been suspended, it will likely resume after the war ends, since both parties have an interest in this type of cooperation. Indeed, despite the current tensions, this type of coordination is almost inevitable given the respective situations of both countries, and as one of the most important means of interconnection and networking that can help mitigate armed crises and conflicts between them.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Water, Public Opinion, Energy, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Jordan

210. Egypt Polling Shows Rise in Positive Views of Hamas; Iran-Backed Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood Remain Unpopular

Author:
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
While Hamas has experienced a surge of popular support in Egypt, these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, remained deeply unpopular among Egyptians. Arecent public opinion survey of Egyptian citizens, commissioned by the Washington Institute and conducted in November/December by a regional commercial firm, revealed that after years of adopting a negative view towards Hamas, three-quarters of Egyptians now view the movement positively, demonstrating the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on Egyptian public opinion. The majority of Egyptians continue to reject ties with Israel and Israelis, while Iran’s proxies remain unpopular, while the majority of Egyptians believe that the United States can put an end to the war in Gaza. Regarding the United States’ role in the ongoing war in Gaza, the current poll showed that more than three-quarters of Egyptians agreed that “the U.S. is still in the best position to help end the war in Gaza, even if I disagree with its policies.” However, Egyptians are currently divided on the proposition that “We cannot count on the U.S. these days, so we should look more to other nations like Russia or China as partners.” While 57% of Egyptians agreed with this proposition, 42% disagreed. In terms of the role that Arab countries should play in the ongoing conflict, the current poll showed mixed views. A significant majority of Egyptians (97%) demanded that Arab states take a tough stand against Israel and “immediately sever all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Yet although not unanimous, over two thirds (69%) of Egyptians likewise agreed that “Arab governments should take a more active role in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, offering both sides incentives to take more moderate positions.” Moreover, an overwhelming majority (96%) of Egyptians believed that their country should provide more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, even if that requires some practical coordination with Israel. Notably, while Hamas has experienced a surge of popularity—in line with significant jumps among other Arab publics polled—these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The current Egyptian government finds both the Muslim Brotherhood itself and its Palestinian offshoot threatening to domestic politics. For almost eight years, since the release of the Fall 2015 poll results, where Hamas received negative scores, the majority of Egyptians demonstrated a negative attitude towards Hamas. In contrast, the current poll shows that three-quarters of Egyptians view Hamas positively, while less than a quarter hold a negative view. Likewise, the large majority expressed agreement with the view that the war in
Topic:
Public Opinion, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Polls, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, and Egypt