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1. What next for NATO? Views from the North-East Flank on Alliance Adaptation

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Linas Kojala, Toms Rostoks, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO leaders have invited Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to present proposals at their next Summit for measures to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role. To support his reflection process, the Secretary General has appointed a group of ten experts. Only one of these represents the 14 of 30 Allies who have joined NATO since 1999. In this policy paper we set out issues, concerns and expectations about NATO’s future adaptation from the perspective of the three Baltic states and Poland, based on a series of interviews with several senior officials and members of the expert community in each of the four states. While not identical, the views of our interviewees were close. They broadly agreed that while NATO faces a multitude of threats, Russia is by far the most serious. In response, NATO should prioritise—and enhance—its core task of collective defence. However, they recognised, it is essential for NATO to maintain a balance between the security interests of all Allies. They support the 360-degree approach and are ready to back and participate in efforts to deal with threats from other regions too. NATO should also retain its core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The Covid-19 pandemic suggests that NATO should re-calibrate the crisis management task to better reflect the need for collective support to the civilian authorities in large-scale efforts to deal with crises on Alliance territory. Our interviewees were generally cautious about otherwise expanding NATO’s roles and responsibilities, arguing that the Alliance should consider where it can add value, while avoiding overreach. They saw, for example, only a modest role for NATO in dealing with the challenge from China. They were, however, supportive of the Alliance developing further its global network of partnerships, both with states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, and with other international organisations, notably the EU. NATO should also continue its cooperative security efforts with a focus on states in the immediate neighbourhood. And while further NATO enlargement is unlikely at present, the door should certainly remain open. Interviewees in all four states expressed concerns about the tensions within the Alliance and the lack of US leadership. While these tensions persist, it is probably unwise to consider drafting a new strategic concept. Nonetheless, the internal challenges might be eased if the Allies are prepared to use NATO to a greater extent as forum for consultation on a wide range of security issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

2. Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region

Author:
Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has revitalised its core business of deterrence and defence and adapted it to today’s political and geostrategic circumstances. In the Baltic region, the most visible expression of this effort has been the deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Poland and the three Baltic states. These are, in turn, backed up by a readiness and reinforcement strategy, which NATO has also strengthened through the adoption of a number of measures agreed by the Allies. But deterrence is a complex matter that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, information-related, and other aspects. In the Baltic region, the constraints of geography coupled with the proximity of the region to Russia pose particular challenges to NATO’s approach. The region remains a focus of tensions between Russia and the West and the three Baltic states are still NATO’s most vulnerable members. Moscow, meanwhile, pretends that it is particularly threatened in the Baltic region, where it regards the territory of the Baltic states as a potential bridgehead of American power projection and presents NATO’s deterrence measures as a deliberate, unprovoked and unjustified build-up of forces around its periphery. Two interdependent developments in the period since 2014 have pointed to a particular need to re-examine the credibility of NATO’s posture as it pertains to the Baltic region: first, Russia’s continued programme to achieve conventional military superiority in its western direction; and second, its recent deployment of new mobile, land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles. The former has given Russia has a substantial numerical advantage in ground forces in the Baltic region which give Moscow the option of executing a rapid land-grab attack before NATO could react. The latter could be used to try to decouple Europe from the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US, paralysing NATO decision making and undermining the Allies’ resolve. Full and expeditious implementation of all decisions taken at Warsaw and Brussels to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is therefore imperative. In this policy paper, we recommend some steps that NATO should take in order to strengthen the deterrent effect of NATO forces and to ensure that timely reinforcement of its peripheries is feasible. In the light of a US Congressional request for a detailed assessment from the Pentagon on whether to expand US military presence in the Baltic states, we pay particular attention to the role of US forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Political stability, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States

3. Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War

Author:
Ben Hodges, Tony Lawrence, and Ray Wojcik
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s ability to efficiently move large and heavy armed forces into and across Europe is a key aspect of its deterrence and defence posture. In establishing the enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the three Baltic states, NATO leaders acknowledged that credible deterrence would also require these small multinational forces to be underpinned by a robust reinforcement strategy. In this report, we examine this key aspect of NATO’s defence and deterrence posture as it relates to the Baltic region. In a crisis, military movement in Europe is likely to be confronted by legal and procedural obstacles, by the limited capacity of infrastructure, and by issues related to coordination, command and control. The severity of these problems would vary according to the type of crisis. For an operation to restore Alliance territory following an armed attack, the sheer scale and breadth of NATO’s requirements for military movement would present a major challenge to Europe’s transport infrastructure, and to prioritisation and coordination efforts. NATO has had little practice in reinforcing Allies at scale since the end of the Cold War. A preventative deployment to respond to a potential crisis, meanwhile, would put a premium on speed of movement. In this case, legal and procedural obstacles may be more problematic as timescales for dealing with the bureaucracy would be similar to the timescales for the movement itself. NATO and the EU have cooperated widely to mitigate the legal and procedural challenges of moving armed forces across the European continent, but the processes in place remain numerous and complex. NATO and the EU have also collaborated on the harder task of ensuring that transport infrastructure is suited to military needs. Movement would be challenged by both physical constraints, such as weight limits on roads and bridges and traffic volume restrictions for rail transport, and procedural ones, such as the limitations of the contractual arrangements necessary to enable the use of civilian railway wagons and heavy equipment transporters for military purposes. Such constraints, while manageable in peacetime, may make it difficult to meet the armed forces’ requirements for large-scale movement during crisis. Furthermore, the Baltic region also lacks supporting logistics infrastructure, for example for receiving and staging (and sustaining for extended periods) forces that have arrived in the region. A third set of challenges arises from the need for coordination among the multiple agencies involved in the movement of armed forces. Even amongst movement specialists there is no clear picture of how these agencies would work together during crises or of how movements would be prioritised to serve the operational needs of the Joint Force Commander.
Topic:
NATO, War, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States