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1. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:
Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

2. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

3. Geopolitics of Europe’s Hydrogen Aspirations: Creating Sustainable Equilibrium or a Combustible Mix?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Tomas Janeliūnas, Andrian Prokip, Iliya Kusa, Alan Riley, Andrei V. Belyi, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Miguel Sainz de Vicuña
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture. While elevating new aspects of geopolitical interplays, such as the importance of technology and regional clusters, hydrogen development might also unwittingly transplant present-day challenges—such as excessive dependence on the energy supply from hostile powers—into the carbon-neutral future. Since Europe’s energy sovereignty and geopolitical role in its neighbourhood could be at stake, the nexus of geopolitics, energy security and hydrogen development should be given serious attention. At the same time, the transformative socioeconomic impact of energy transition will create winners and losers within and between nations, which in some cases will have national security implications; hydrogen development could offer ways to mitigate this. This report focuses on exploring the impact that the European Union’s ambitions and plans for hydrogen development—including an expansion of its infrastructure in the form of the European Hydrogen Backbone—on its geopolitical position up to 2040. It first looks into the greater detail of the EU Hydrogen Strategy and how it links with the Energy Union, as well as with European strategic autonomy and energy sovereignty issues. It finds that hydrogen development—alongside the growth of the renewable energy sector—offers a great opportunity to reduce the current exposure to hostile actors through the energy sector that often hampers Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical force in its neighbourhood. However, it also warns that the lack of unity and coherence currently afflicting the Energy Union, and manifest in such recent controversies as the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, could potentially weaken such a positive geopolitical impact of hydrogen. Although hydrogen development requires Europe to draw upon external suppliers, the fact that this supply can come from many countries provides a significant opportunity for diversification and reducing the potency of energy supply as a geopolitical weapon. In this regard, two directions stand out in the EU’s neighbourhood—Ukraine in the east, and the Mediterranean along with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the south. Both have huge potential for playing major roles in the European hydrogen supply chains, and their cultivation by the EU would provide many opportunities both to strengthen the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and to build new partnerships. Certainly, neither of those directions comes without risks and downsides: political instability and armed conflicts, poor governance, unstable investment environment, water scarcity, and in some cases dependence on the hydrocarbons industry for income will be significant factors hampering the efforts to unlock their potential. Ukraine in particular will require sustained reconstruction efforts to tackle the massive devastation caused by Russia’s war. This will divert resources and attention, but transforming its energy sector and developing its hydrogen production base could still be important strands of these efforts. Europe’s own potential for domestic hydrogen production is another direction that this report looks into as a way to disentangle from the present-day geopolitically toxic dependencies and enhance its energy sovereignty. The Baltic states and Finland represent an interesting case study on how hydrogen could underpin a regional cooperation cluster with a high degree of integration—one of the new characteristics of the hydrogen era that will have geopolitical implications. The report, however, finds that different national perspectives on hydrogen, lack of coordination, and certain issues of trust arising from recent failures of solidarity and unity when tackling the regional nexus of energy security and geopolitics might hamper future regional cooperation in hydrogen. The hydrogen economy also offers some important benefits in managing national security challenges at the national level. In Estonia, the loss of the fossil fuel-based industry in the highly sensitive north-eastern region of Ida-Virumaa will be a socioeconomic blow to the local population. This report highlights how the vulnerability of the region, dominated by the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who are already highly exposed to Russia’s malignant influence activities, could imperil Estonia’s energy transition and its national security. Creating a national hydrogen cluster in this region, drawing upon its industrial infrastructure and human capital, could mitigate the consequences of decarbonisation and energy transition. However, these considerations do not seem to receive sufficient attention from the government and energy businesses when drawing Estonia’s hydrogen map of the future. The report recommends that various stakeholders in the EU—including those behind the European Hydrogen Backbone—continuously monitor and assess the geopolitical risks, especially in terms of their impact on European energy sovereignty, when creating and managing new hydrogen-related interdependencies with the regions and countries outside the EU. The report urges the EU to support energy transition and necessary market and governance reforms in post-war Ukraine and the MENA countries to facilitate their emergence as crucial and reliable partners in hydrogen value chains. The report also recommends closer coordination and common planning between hydrogen stakeholders of the Baltic states and Finland when forming a regional cluster of hydrogen supply that would contribute to European energy sovereignty. Last but not least, it suggests that, for national security and resilience reasons, Estonia should focus more attention on the Ida-Virumaa region when developing its national hydrogen roadmap.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa, and Baltic States

4. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States

Author:
Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

5. Winds of Change, or More of the Same?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Priit Mändmaa, Emma Hakala, Tomas Janeliūnas, Juris Ozoliņš, and Krystian Kowalewski
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
By coincidence perhaps more than design, the ‘winds of change’ in the twelve months between autumn 2018 and 2019 ushered in new governments—whether through national elections or through coalition reshuffling—in five Baltic Sea littoral states: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Yet, amidst sometimes rather turbulent domestic political debates, one key cluster of topics was virtually absent: energy security and climate policy. With the vital exception of Finland—a state with a relatively strong Green movement and long tradition of climate and environmental activism—no country saw climate or energy security targets raised as key campaign issues. To the extent that energy security and climate topics were mentioned at all, they either were minimized due to parties’ fear of alienating key voting blocs (as with the coal mining sector in Poland), confined to energy stakeholders and technical audiences due their complexity (as with electricity desynchronisation in the Baltic countries) or completely assimilated into a cross-party foreign policy consensus (as in the universal opposition in Lithuania to the Astravyets nuclear power plant project in Belarus). While domestic factors—including perceived national interests in ensuring energy self-sufficiency—contributed to a serious case of policy inertia, small and interconnected countries do not of course exist in a vacuum. Accordingly, international factors—from the continuing use of energy policy as an instrument of geopolitical power by Russia, to the growing consensus in the EU in favor of more ambitious climate targets—have done more to raise the salience of these issues, especially after the von der Leyen Commission took office in Brussels at the end of 2019 and put forward the so-called European Green Deal. These exogenous factors have finally, for instance, triggered a broader reassessment in Estonia of that country’s rather leisurely planned phase-out of oil shale power generation, while pushing political leaders in all five countries at least rhetorically to embrace the goal of a carbon-neutral future (albeit with considerable differences in timelines and methodology). Amidst a volatile international economic and geopolitical context that—since the time work began on this report—now includes a major global pandemic and a dramatic fall in fossil fuel demand and prices, the region’s political and economic leaders clearly cannot count on being able to make their policy selections in a vacuum. While the goal of an integrated regional energy market is closer than ever to being achieved, regional cooperation still has much to be desired; differing attitudes to issues both technical (e.g. harmonising natural gas regulations, which has left Lithuania outside a new regional market) or fundamental (importing third-country electricity generated without regard to EU climate or pollution standards) leave all five countries less able to respond to challenges ahead. While the region’s countries have largely relied on Brussels to broker compromises (often with the help of considerable funding), in a post-pandemic world, both the political bandwidth and financial resources will likely be constrained. In its country sections, this report captures a valuable snapshot of the relative inertia as well as the degree of evolution of the energy and climate policies of the five countries in the face of that year’s fairly calm international context. Given the significant economic, human, and political changes underway as a result of the pandemic, however, it is an open question to what extent the region can weather the far more turbulent times ahead. The political and societal willingness to pursue the energy transition to a carbon-neutral future through new—more ambitious and certainly more expensive—energy and climate policies as a response to the climate emergency will very much depend on how the impact of the pandemic plays out globally, in Europe and in the Baltic area. It will also require strong leadership from a new generation of political, business and societal leaders able to see green recovery as a major opportunity for their nations in terms of economic development, social welfare and national security.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Politics, Governance, European Union, Economy, Sustainability, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, and Baltic States

6. Brexit and Baltic Sea Security

Author:
Riina Kaljurand, Tony Lawrence, Pauli Järvenpää, and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The result of the UK’s June 2016 referendum on continued membership of the EU was unexpected and its consequences may be wide-ranging and grave. This report considers the impact of the UK’s exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’) on the security of Estonia, the Baltic Sea region and Europe more widely. Its focus is hard security – military security and defence. The UK is a defence and security actor of considerable prominence, able to contribute significant military capability to the organisations and operations in which it participates. It is, however, sceptical about the place of the EU in defence matters and has achieved a certain level of infamy for its perseverance in obstructing the further development of an EU defence dimension. One immediate consequence of the Brexit referendum result was a burst of ideas for further EU defence integration, which has led to an agreement on the first steps for implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. Not all member states, however, are enthusiastic for these ideas. Interviews conducted for this report with officials and researchers in the Baltic Sea states of Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and also in the UK found that interviewees believed that their countries shared with the UK approaches to security that would be harder to pursue after Brexit without the active support of the UK itself, and were largely sceptical about the need for further defence integration in the EU. In general, though, interviewees felt that the character of the European security environment post-Brexit is very difficult to forecast and the many factors that will contribute to shaping it are highly uncertain, complex, and intertwined. In these circumstances, scenario planning methodologies offer perhaps the best means of thinking about the future and informing policy decisions. The report thus identifies a range of possible post-Brexit scenarios as a vehicle for testing policies and identifying those likely to result in maximum benefit and minimum cost.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States