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1. Cash on Delivery: A New Approach to Foreign Aid

Author:
Nancy Birdsall, Ayah Mahgoub, and William D. Savedoff
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Foreign aid often works, but it is often criticized for being ineffective or even for undermining progress in developing countries. This brief describes a new approach, Cash on Delivery Aid, which gives recipients full responsibility and authority over funds paid in proportion to verified measures of progress. Through the example of using COD Aid to support universal primary-school completion, the brief illustrates a practical approach to aid that holds the promise of making aid more effective and less burdensome by fundamentally restructuring the relationships of accountability among funders, recipients, and their respective constituencies.
Topic:
Development, Education, Third World, and Foreign Aid

2. Payments for Progress: A Hands-Off Approach to Foreign Aid

Author:
Nancy Birdsall and Owen Barder
Publication Date:
12-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
There are significant differences of opinion about the merits of additional aid in meeting the MDGs, including whether and how aid should be given in 'fragile states', whether additional aid on the scale envisioned can be effectively used even in well-managed economies, and whether the aid system, particularly in highly aid-dependent countries, undermines instead of strengthens local institutions. We discuss an approach to scaling up foreign aid that would explicitly be aimed at strengthening local capacity and institutions, including in fragile states. “Payments for progress” would link additional aid to clear evidence of progress already achieved on the ground. This approach would give flexibility and autonomy to local institutions, providing an opening for local institutional experimentation, while at the same time ensuring that aid pays only for real, measurable achievements. Donors would bind themselves as a group to pay a specific amount for clear evidence of progress against one or more agreed goals in low-income developing countries. Developing country governments would present an independently audited statement reporting their progress on the measures, and donors would pay the agreed amount. Payments would be determined as a function of the outcomes, and not linked to the implementation of any particular policies, any other intermediate outputs, or “tied” to purchases from particular suppliers or companies. Governments that found ways to provide services efficiently and so reduce the costs of providing them would benefit from a larger surplus. We discuss the issues such an approach raises—in setting the benchmarks against which progress is measured, in avoiding cheating, and in managing unintended negative consequences of an incentives-based approach. We conclude with a summary of the advantages for donors and recipients.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Humanitarian Aid, and Third World

3. Natural Resources, Human Capital, and Growth

Author:
Nancy Birdsall, Thomas Pinckney, and Richard Sabot
Publication Date:
02-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In this paper, we present evidence that among developing countries, those that are resource-abundant invest less in education. We then discuss the economic processes behind this evidence. We describe a virtuous circle in which rising private returns to human capital and other assets lead to increased work effort and higher rates of private investment immediately, including among the poor, and generate higher productivity and lower inequality in the future. With resource abundance, however, governments are tempted to move away from the policies that generate this virtuous circle. Dutch Disease and related effects tend to lower the rate of return to the agricultural and human capital investments available to the poor. Resource rents accumulate in the hands of the government, and/or a small number of businessmen, further reducing incentives to invest. Staple-trap effects lead to the subsidization of capital, thereby taxing labor. The labor market in the resulting capital-intensive economy offers little benefit for moderate levels of education. The government may try to assuage the poor by directing some proportion of resource rents to populist programs that create new fiscal burdens but that do not enhance productivity. In short, resource abundance tends to break the virtuous circle linking education, growth and inequality in several places: the choice of development strategy, the level of inequality, the lack of incentives for investment in education, and the creation of a welfare state. We illustrate this breakdown by contrasting the cases of Korea and Brazil, and, since resource abundance need not be destiny, we conclude with policy lessons for resource-abundant developing economies.
Topic:
Economics, Education, Emerging Markets, Government, Political Economy, and Third World
Political Geography:
Brazil and Korea