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11. Do No Harm: Aid, Weak Institutions, and the Missing Middle in Africa

Author:
Nancy Birdsall
Publication Date:
03-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The implicit assumption of the donor community is that Africa is trapped by its poverty, and that aid is necessary if Africa is to escape the trap. In this note I suggest an alternative assumption: that Africa is caught in an institutional trap, signaled and reinforced by the small share of income of its independent middle-income population. Theory and historical experience elsewhere suggest that a robust middle-income group contributes critically to the creation and sustenance of healthy institutions, particularly healthy institutions of the state. I propose that if external aid is to be helpful for institution-building in Africa's weak and fragile states, donors need to emphasize not providing more aid but minimizing the risks more aid poses for this group in Africa.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Government, and Humanitarian Aid
Political Geography:
Africa

12. Payments for Progress: A Hands-Off Approach to Foreign Aid

Author:
Nancy Birdsall and Owen Barder
Publication Date:
12-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
There are significant differences of opinion about the merits of additional aid in meeting the MDGs, including whether and how aid should be given in 'fragile states', whether additional aid on the scale envisioned can be effectively used even in well-managed economies, and whether the aid system, particularly in highly aid-dependent countries, undermines instead of strengthens local institutions. We discuss an approach to scaling up foreign aid that would explicitly be aimed at strengthening local capacity and institutions, including in fragile states. “Payments for progress” would link additional aid to clear evidence of progress already achieved on the ground. This approach would give flexibility and autonomy to local institutions, providing an opening for local institutional experimentation, while at the same time ensuring that aid pays only for real, measurable achievements. Donors would bind themselves as a group to pay a specific amount for clear evidence of progress against one or more agreed goals in low-income developing countries. Developing country governments would present an independently audited statement reporting their progress on the measures, and donors would pay the agreed amount. Payments would be determined as a function of the outcomes, and not linked to the implementation of any particular policies, any other intermediate outputs, or “tied” to purchases from particular suppliers or companies. Governments that found ways to provide services efficiently and so reduce the costs of providing them would benefit from a larger surplus. We discuss the issues such an approach raises—in setting the benchmarks against which progress is measured, in avoiding cheating, and in managing unintended negative consequences of an incentives-based approach. We conclude with a summary of the advantages for donors and recipients.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Humanitarian Aid, and Third World

13. Will HIPC Matter? The Debt Game and Donor Behaviour in Africa

Author:
Nancy Birdsall, Stijn Claessens, and Ishac Diwan
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
In this paper we focus on the question: will the HIPC debt reduction programme help in the transformation of the development assistance business and change the rules of the 'debt game' in Africa? We concentrate on the donor and official creditor side, by exploring how the growing debt of African countries, over the last two decades, has affected the provision of new resources by the donor community. Our results indicate that if debt levels are reduced sufficiently in high debt countries, donors can shift from the current pattern of non-selectivity and defensive lending to a low debt regime, a regime that has in the past allowed selectivity in lending in relation to levels of poverty and quality of policy.
Topic:
Development and International Organization
Political Geography:
Africa