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Begin New Search Author Mika Aaltola Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Covid-19 – a trigger for global transformation? Political distancing, global decoupling and growing distrust in health governance

Author:
Mika Aaltola
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since late 2019, the world has sought – frantically at times – to appropriate policies for responding to the coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19). This Working Paper reviews the political significance of Covid-19 in order to understand the ways in which it challenges the existing domestic order, international health governance actors and, more fundamentally, the circulation-based modus operandi of the present world order. The analysis begins with the argument that contagious diseases should be regarded as complex open-ended phenomena with various features; they are not reducible to biology and epidemiology alone. In particular, politics and social reactions – in the form of panic and blamecasting, for example – are prominent features with clear historical patterns, and should not, for the sake of efficient health governance, be treated as aspects extraneous to the disease itself. The Working Paper further highlights that when a serious infectious disease spreads, a “threat” is very often externalized into a culturally meaningful “foreign” entity. Pandemics tend to be territorialized, nationalized, ethnicized, and racialized. This has also been the case with Covid-19.
Topic:
Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. The Helsinki Process and its applicability: Towards regional security-building in the Persian Gulf

Author:
Mikael Wigell and Mika Aaltola
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The idea of a ‘Middle East Helsinki Process’ has been raised as a potential collective security mechanism to help avoid major political regressions and violent spirals. The Helsinki Process, known for reducing tensions between the Soviet Union and the West in the 1970s, can provide some useful lessons, but the region will have to develop its own model by drawing on past experiences and the region-specific threat perceptions and political needs. Non-interference, sovereignty and the protection of religious rights could serve as useful starting principles for regional security-building in the Middle East. Drawing on the lessons learnt from the Helsinki Process, specific recommendations for a possible Middle East Process would be as follows: i) establish a regional initiative for building a security architecture in the Persian Gulf inspired by the Helsinki Process and its institutionalization; ii) establish a channel for Track 1, state-to-state-level consultations; iii) focus on the basic security guarantees that are common to the Persian Gulf states; and iv) maximize regional ownership, but with external facilitation.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Geostrategically motivated co-option of social media: The case of Chinese LinkedIn spy recruitment

Author:
Mika Aaltola
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Social media platforms enable a strategically motivated and harmful set of practices that leverage both their scalability and targeting potentials. The wider vulnerabilities of digitalized democracies have been much discussed in connection with election meddling and disinformation campaigning. However, the emphasis here is on the more direct vulnerability of mass spy recruitment. The ongoing LinkedIn-based mass recruitment provides a case in point, representing a dangerous vulnerability that can lead to the theft of intellectual property and confidential materials, as well as to the setting up of influence networks. An important case in point is the Chinese co-option of LinkedIn for gaining operatives in and confidential information from Western states and enterprises. Exposing the emerging adversary techniques used by resourceful state actors is the first counter-step. Moreover, preparedness needs to be highlighted, counter-measures modernized, and laws updated to address the new vulnerabilities.
Topic:
Intelligence, Science and Technology, Social Media, Covert, and Spy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. Trumps First Year at the Helm

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen and Mika Aaltola
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s first year as President has been marked by continuity in US security policy, a partial challenge to the global principles of free trade, and a sea change in commitments to the liberal international order. These reflect a view of the international system as a zero-sum competitive realm.
Topic:
International Political Economy, Political Theory, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. The sustainability of the questionable US presidency: The Trump era might last longer than expected

Author:
Mika Aaltola
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The 2020 US presidential election could be a close call with a narrow margin of victory. Many key factors underlying Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral success are still active and might suffice to win over a very polarized electorate in an extremely ugly election.
Topic:
International Affairs and Democracy
Political Geography:
America

6. Election Hacking in Democracies: The example of the U.S. 2016 elections

Author:
Mika Aaltola and Mariita Mattiisen
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The US, as a highly digitalized state, depends on different cyber platforms for election campaigning, political discussions, forming popular opinions, and – in some cases – the voting process itself. Geopolitically motivated election hacking can aim to influence the direction of foreign policy debates, to promote/demote candidate(s), and to instigate disruptions, suspicions, and distrust towards the election process or the democratic system. The strategic aim to lower democratic appeal and increase the attraction of autocratic "stability”. A state sponsor of hacking can demonstrate that it has sophisticated cyber capabilities, thereby promoting its own major power standing. Even if its efforts raise suspicions, it gains visibility, as its efforts are discussed in the media and it manages to insert itself into the election discussions. The state sponsor can subtly promote the images of its own type of political system as being comparatively more resilient and stable than the US democratic system. The relative success of the election hacking targeting the US might motivate scaling up the intensity and scope of similar operations in future democratic elections. At a minimum, the election hacking incidents point to a scenario that has to be taken seriously.
Topic:
International Relations, Corruption, International Affairs, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
America

7. Pushed together by external forces? The foreign and security policies of Estonia and Finland in the context of the Ukraine crisis

Author:
Katri Pynnöniemi, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Mika Aaltola, and Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
New turbulence in the international environment is pushing Estonia and Finland closer together in the foreign and security policy domain. The Ukraine crisis has re-introduced old geopolitical constraints and concerns about national security and sovereignty, limiting the room for manoeuvre for small states. Estonia and Finland took similar positions on many key issues regarding the Ukraine crisis. The common ground is based on both countries' attachment to the liberal world order and Western structures. However, there are deep-rooted differences between the Estonian and Finnish positions on the way to handle Russia and the need to adjust security arrangements, notably the role of NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region. It is common in Finland to see Estonia's approach as unhelpfully hawkish, and common in Estonia to see Finland's approach as too accommodating towards Russia. Shared interests stem from an understanding that the weakening of the security of one country inevitably weakens the security of the other. As both countries are investing more in national security and defence, relevant bilateral cooperation is increasing.
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Finland, and Estonia