11. Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy : 16 May - 15 August 2009
- Author:
- Michele K. Esposito
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Palestine Studies
- Institution:
- Institute for Palestine Studies
- Abstract:
- This quarter marked the rocky opening of a new chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as the freshly elected Israeli and U.S. administrations set to work, laying out approaches toward the peace process that were markedly different from their predecessors' and nearly diametrically opposed to each other. A major policy clash between U.S. pres. Barack Obama and Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu over settlements overshadowed most of the quarter. The other striking feature of the quarter overall was the extremely low level of Israeli-Palestinian violence. Though Israel's siege of Gaza (in place since 6/07) continued, the Gaza cease-fire held without major violations. In the West Bank, Israel scaled back routine military operations and facilitated Palestinian movement between major population centers, particularly in the north, improving trade and quality of life. At the opening of the quarter, however, Israeli-Palestinian cross-border violence in Gaza was moderate and rising while in the West Bank violence remained low. Israel's siege of Gaza, intended to pressure the Hamas government there, entered its 24th month, hampering efforts to maintain basic services and repair infrastructure and other damages from Israel's Operation Cast Lead (OCL) offensive targeting the Strip, which ended on 1/18/09 (see JPS 151 for background). Israel allowed an average of 106 truckloads/day of humanitarian goods and commodities into Gaza through Kerem Shalom crossing 6 days/week (far less that the 500 truckloads/day the UN estimated were necessary to meet Gazans' basic needs); limited fodder and seed through Qarni crossing; enough fuel through the Nahal Oz crossing to maintain emergency services and run Gaza's electricity plant at 69% capacity, as well as some cooking gas. Only a very limited number of medical cases, employees of international organizations, and VIPs were allow to transit through the Rafah and Erez crossings. Restrictions on Palestinian movement and access in the West Bank remained tight, with more than 630 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) checkpoints and roadblocks dividing the territory into 3 cantons, and Palestinian access to Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley strictly limited. As of 5/15, at least 7,516 Palestinians (including 50 Israeli Arabs and 19 unidentified Arab cross-border infiltrators), 1,090 Israelis (including 348 IDF soldiers and security personnel, 214 settlers, 528 civilians), and 64 foreign nationals (including 2 British suicide bombers) had been killed since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada on 9/28/00. Netanyahu and Obama Face Fundamental Differences As the quarter opened, the newly elected Obama and Netanyahu administrations were fully staffed and briefed, and Obama was ready to move forward with campaign pledges to take early action to revive the peace process. His hope was to meet personally with the main players in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to discuss his developing policy initiatives, as well as regional and bilateral issues, before making a major address to the Muslim world on 6/4 in fulfillment of another campaign promise. Late last quarter, he had met with Jordan's King Abdallah, tapping him as his intermediary with the Arab states (see Quarterly Update in JPS 152). Scheduled next were White House meetings with PM Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority (PA) pres. Mahmud Abbas, and Egyptian pres. Husni Mubarak (whose envoys were mediating Palestinian national unity talks, and cease-fire and prisoner release negotiations between Israel and Hamas). Netanyahu was scheduled to visit first, 5/18–19. Since its 3/31/09 inauguration, his government had been engaged in a comprehensive review of Israeli policy, with the intention of issuing its formal government platform timed with the Washington visit (see Quarterly Update in JPS 152). Even while the review was underway, however, Netanyahu had laid out a number of strong base-line positions including: (1) stating that containing the threat from Iran was more important than achieving peace with the Palestinians and Arab states; (2) demanding a halt to Iran's nuclear program and Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state as preconditions for resuming final status talks with the Palestinians; (3) refusing to express support for a 2-state solution, preferring an “economic peace” aimed at improving Palestinian quality of life and allowing a greater measure of self-rule, while maintaining ultimate Israeli security control; (4) vowing continued Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and (5) pledging that a united Jerusalem would remain under sole Israeli control. The Obama administration, meanwhile, had repeatedly expressed (1) “vigorous” support for a 2-state solution and implementation of the 2003 road map plan, including an immediate and complete halt to Israeli settlement construction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank; and (2) the strong belief that progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace would put added pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear program, meaning these 2 goals should be pursued in parallel. The U.S. had also strongly urged the Arab states (via King Abdallah) to make gestures to Israel, ideally dropping demands for the Palestinian refugees' right of return and taking preliminary steps toward normalization, to encourage Israel to come to quick final status agreements on all tracks (see Quarterly Update in JPS 152). The strong and conflicting positions of the 2 administrations raised concerns that the Obama-Netanyahu meeting would be tense and could mark the opening of a serious diplomatic dispute. As Netanyahu prepared to depart for Washington, Israeli DM Ehud Barak (5/16) and Pres. Shimon Peres (5/17) gave public assurances that Netanyahu would abide by Israel's previous agreements with the Palestinians, including the 2003 road map—which they each described as calling for “2 peoples living side by side in peace and security.” Peres also stated that progress toward this end would ultimately depend on the outcome of Palestinian national unity talks (i.e., the PA's ability to curb Hamas) and “greater Palestinian efforts to ensure Israel's security.” In fact, the 2003 agreement had not called for 2 peoples but 2 states living side by side. While the U.S. did not publicly challenge Israel's new formulation, the lack of official acknowledgement (much less welcoming) of Israel's “assurances” indicated the administration's awareness of Israel's attempt to reinterpret the road map's goal and its unwillingness to paper over core differences with an ambiguous formulation. Ultimately, Israel did not issue a formal government platform, which allowed Netanyahu a greater margin to avoid public clashes on sensitive issues. The 5/18 talks went forward as planned, with visible policy gaps but no outward tension. Statements issued afterward by Obama and Netanyahu were bland, stressing shared goals of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons (see Iran section below) and pursing peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Netanyahu stated that he was ready to reopen talks with the Palestinians “immediately” regarding limited self-rule, provided the Palestinians first recognized Israel as a Jewish state and agreed to “allow Israel the means to defend itself” (i.e., to retain parts of the West Bank as buffer zones). Obama publicly restated support for the creation of a Palestinian state; reiterated outstanding Israeli responsibilities under existing treaties, including stopping settlement expansion and removing restrictions on Palestinian movement and access; called on Israel to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza; and said that Arab states had “to be more supportive and be bolder in seeking potential normalization with Israel.” The U.S. and Israel agreed to set up 3 working groups that would meet periodically to discuss progress toward: (1) peace with the Palestinians, (2) normalization with Arabs states, and (3) curbing Iran. Netanyahu went on to hold talks with Secy. of State Hilary Clinton (5/18), Defense Secy. Robert Gates (5/19), and leaders of Congress (5/19) that outwardly seemed unremarkable. Only after Netanyahu returned home did details emerge of the heated nature of the Washington talks (e.g., Washington Post [WP] 5/24, New York Times [NYT] 5/29, Ha'Aretz [HA] 6/11). In the 2-hour closed-door meeting, Obama reportedly pressed Netanyahu to support the creation of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu nuanced his position, stating that Palestinian statehood was still the ultimate goal but far in the future because Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy needed to develop, and Palestinian education and discourse needed time to evolve to the point of promoting coexistence. Obama pressed Netanyahu to fulfill 2003 road map obligations to halt settlement construction and remove all unauthorized settlement outposts. Netanyahu agreed to consult with his government on taking steps to remove outposts, but said he must allow expansion of authorized West Bank settlements to accommodate natural growth. He agreed to send DM Barak to Washington on 6/1 with a formal Israeli counterproposal on settlements. Netanyahu aides later revealed (HA 6/11) that the PM was “'stunned' . . . to hear what seemed like a well-coordinated attack against his stand on settlements . . . from congressional leaders, key lawmakers dealing with foreign relations, and even from a group of Jewish members” of Congress, describing their statements against settlement expansion as “harsh and unequivocal.” Historically strongly pro-Israel rep. Robert Wexler (D-FL) confirmed (5/23) that he had told Netanyahu that the mood on settlements in Washington had changed, stating that for Obama to secure “a substantive down payment on the normalization of relations with Israel” from the Arab states, Israel would have to address settlements “in a serious manner.” Another congressional aide, speaking anonymously, said Jewish lawmakers had felt “it was their responsibility to make [Netanyahu] very, very aware of the concerns of the administration and Congress.” Adding to Israel's unease, Secy. of State Clinton stated in an interview with al-Jazeera on 5/19, immediately after Netanyahu's departure: “We want to see a stop to settlement construction, additions, natural growth—any kind of settlement activity. That is what the president has called for.” Her statements reportedly (NYT 5/29) surprised Israeli officials who thought Obama would keep the settlement dispute private until Netanyahu consulted with his government. By contrast, Abbas's first meeting with Obama in Washington on 5/28, just when U.S-Israel relations were particularly tense over the settlement issue (see below), was described by U.S. officials privy to the talks as much more amicable. Obama praised the PA's stand against forming a unity government with Hamas until it renounced violence and recognized Israel's right to exist; reiterated strong U.S. support for a 2-state solution as being in the interests of the Palestinians, Israel, and the U.S.; and applauded the PA's “great progress” improving security in coordination with U.S. security envoy Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, though he stressed that Palestinians still had much more to do to meet their requirements of improving security as laid out under the 2003 road map. Afterward, Obama publicly reiterated that Israel must build momentum for peace by halting all settlement activity and alleviating restrictions on Palestinian travel and commerce. Abbas also met with Secy. Clinton and Obama's national security adviser (NSA) Gen. James Jones. Meanwhile, Mubarak cancelled (5/20) his scheduled to visit Washington on 5/26 after the sudden death of his 12-year-old grandson. Since Obama had already announced that he would give his major address to the Muslim world in Cairo (see below), where the two could consult on the sidelines, the cancellation was not seen as a problem.
- Political Geography:
- Washington, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza