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1. Competitive Harmonisation: A Collaborative Framework for Intra-EU Reform and Competitiveness

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Persistent legal fragmentation, compounded by the EU’s 24 official languages, increases costs and legal uncertainty, deterring meaningful investments in innovation and preventing businesses from scaling across borders. Without bold, comprehensive legal reforms, Europe will fall further behind in global competition and major global technological developments. The EU’s incremental reform approach has failed to address the deep-rooted legal and institutional challenges threatening Europe’s economic future. Competitive Harmonisation offers a pragmatic yet visionary concept to overcome legal fragmentation, tackle the business scale gap, and unlock Europe’s vast economic potential. By embracing “collaborative governance” through coalitions of willing Member States, aligning with global standards, and prioritising innovation and technology diffusion, European governments can enhance the Single Market and restore Europe’s leadership in lawmaking and industrial competitiveness. Amid growing political risks, such as the threat of tariffs, the responsibility to act decisively rests squarely with Europe. By taking bold, pragmatic steps now, Europeans can not only resolve immediate challenges but also lay the groundwork for sustainable, long-term economic development.
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, Regional Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Reinventing Europe’s Single Market: A Way Forward to Align Ideals and Action

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
It is essential for EU institutions and Member State governments to shift their focus from the abstract concept of the “Single Market” to the concrete objective of “legal harmonisation in the EU.” This transition represents a strategic realignment towards more pragmatic policymaking. Adopting a 28th regime to address national regulation discrepancies would align with this goal and enhance the Single Market’s effectiveness in promoting economic growth and competitiveness. Given the EU’s ongoing loss of relative global economic clout, it is crucial to establish an ambitious timeline for implementing the most critical Single Market reforms. The Letta Report serves as a wake-up call to revitalise the EU’s Single Market, emphasising the need for decisive action. Its vision largely hinges on legal harmonisation within Europe, building on early efforts to liberalise markets and establish a truly integrated European market. Despite efforts, “integration fatigue” remains a significant challenge due to legal fragmentation across European economies. Previous reports, from the Cecchini Report in 1992 to the Europe 2020 Strategy, have highlighted persistent issues like regulatory divergences and declining political support for market integration. Despite numerous proposals, progress has been limited, and many challenges persist or have worsened (see Section 2). An analysis of EU reports reveals a shift in policy priorities over time. Initially, there was a strong focus on liberalisation and market opening, with less attention given to state aid and industrial policymaking. The Letta Report highlights the importance of regulatory convergence and harmonisation, reflecting a deeper understanding and recognition of the drivers of EU competitiveness. The rise of nationalism and a shift towards “Strategic Autonomy” within the EU have hindered crucial market reforms. This highlights the importance of aligning laws across Member States to strengthen and reinforce EU’s economic resilience and international competitiveness (see Section 3). EU institutions and Member State governments should set specific goals for “legal harmonisation in the EU.” This shift would address real challenges faced by businesses and citizens, and build political will for necessary reforms. Prioritising legal harmonisation would enhance internal cohesion and align national laws with Union-wide goals. An actionable roadmap – potentially with a 2028 deadline – is crucial to address the substantial gap between ambitious EU strategies and Europe’s economic realities. (see Section 4). Implementing sector-specific and horizontal policies in a new regulatory regime would improve cross-border operations and competitiveness. The Letta Report advocates for a European Code of Business Law to establish a unified regulatory framework, introducing a 28th legal regime to address national regulation discrepancies. Extending this regime to include tax and labour market policies would significantly enhance cross-border operations. The EU and Member State governments can eliminate substantial internal barriers by prioritising key horizontal policies affecting all businesses, such as fragmented tax laws, labour market policies, and social security systems. Simplifying and harmonising these policies on the basis of the facilitation of four freedoms is crucial for unlocking the Single Market’s potential for businesses and workers, boosting the EU’s global competitiveness. Allowing coalitions of willing countries to advance in certain areas of legal integration provides a viable solution to the long-standing Single Market “fatigue”. By enabling smaller groups of Member States to pursue integration in specific areas, the EU can bypass the constraints imposed by rigid voting requirements and achieve greater agility, accountability, and acceptance in EU law-making. This approach not only fosters flexibility but also upholds the fundamental principles and objectives of the EU. To ensure the integrity of the EU legal order and prevent unjustified barriers or discrimination against non-participating members, it is essential to establish safeguards and oversight mechanisms. These measures would maintain cohesion within the Union while allowing for progressive legal integration among willing Member States.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Digital Economy, and Economic Integration
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Future-proofing the EU’s Investment Attractiveness: A Bold Reform Agenda for Competition Enforcement, Taxation and Digital Policy

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Reducing the deterrent effects from EU and Member State laws in three key cross-sector policy areas – competition policy, business taxes and VAT, and digital policies – could significantly enhance the business environment within the Single Market and boost the EU’s attractiveness to both domestic and foreign investors. The EU’s future competitiveness is at risk due to a significant disparity in investments, particularly in technological innovation, compared to the US. Despite having a larger population and labour force, the EU lags behind in large business activities, with US firms consistently outspending their European counterparts in key tech-intensive sectors such as software, computer services, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. Moreover, China and other emerging nations are rapidly catching up, dramatically diminishing the EU’s relative economic and political influence on the global stage. The urgency for the EU to bridge these gaps is more critical than ever (Section 2). The EU’s profound investment gap highlights a systemic advantage for the US in fostering innovation and economic growth. The EU’s regulatory complexity, largely driven by legal fragmentation in horizontal policies, further exacerbate the situation, deterring cross-border activities reducing the region’s attractiveness to global investors (Section 3).
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, Digital Economy, Investment, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe

5. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:
Europe

6. What is Wrong with Europe’s Shattered Single Market? – Lessons from Policy Fragmentation and Misdirected Approaches to EU Competition Policy

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
What is wrong with Europe’s Single Market? The brief answer to that question is that it does not really exist – it is unsingle. The Single Market is in many ways a political illusion. It exists only nominally. Any company doing business in Europe faces significant barriers to cross-border exchanges within the EU, and it is these barriers that hamper companies’ ability to scale and compete internationally on the back of innovation and economic integration. We outline that Brussels and national governments need to beat the drum for eliminating policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market and at the same time change course in competition policy to sufficiently support investments in innovation, business growth, and the adoption of advanced technologies across industries. Major economic indicators show that Europe is caught in a protracted corporate and technology crisis. The EU has for a very long time now been tailing US corporate and innovation leadership. At the same time, competition with technology-intensive imports from China is getting increasingly intense. Europe’s underperformance is rooted in a legally fragmented internal market which is disincentivising business growth and innovation. On top of that, an outdated approach to competition policy is discouraging businesses from adopting innovation and scaling across national borders, risking that EU companies continue to lose clout and international competitiveness. 30 years have passed since the formal establishment of Europe’s Single Market. Data reveals that regulatory convergence has reversed or come to a halt in most policy areas. Recent policies for technologies and digital business models, which are key sources of cross-industry competitiveness, created new layers of regulation and legal uncertainty in EU and Member State law. Overall, EU policies have not significantly helped European companies, large and small, to do business in another Member State or use advanced technology-enabled services. EU competition policy does not live up to its promise to “enable the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market”. Europe’s competition policy is still fragmented along national borders and largely ignorant to dynamic effects of competition, especially investments in innovation. Due to mixed legal competences, competition rules are often enforced differently by Member States’ national authorities and can be appropriated to support protectionist industrial policy ambitions. The recently enacted Digital Market Act (DMA) demonstrates that the European Commission and Member State authorities favour protection and discretionary enforcement over innovation and economic disruption, without providing solid evidence of abusive business behaviour and consumer harm. With the DMA, the EU introduced legislation with serious ambiguities in objectives, concepts, and rules, and explicitly allows national Member States to regulate competition at their own discretion. A recent attempt by Germany’s competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, to enforce its own rulebook for large digital companies (Section 19a of the German Competition Act) risks creating a patchwork of competition rules for large providers of advanced digital services across the EU. Local adopters of advanced digital services, particularly small businesses, that use advanced technology services to compete in their markets would be confronted with less choice and quality. Recently imposed policies under the umbrella of European Strategic Autonomy will hardly help policymakers in their ambition to achieve “innovation and technology leadership”. The paramount task for the EU and national governments is to eliminate policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market, accompanied by an approach to competition policy that embraces investments in innovation and business growth while accounting for the substantial value created through the adoption of innovative technologies and disruptive business models across industries in the EU.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Online Platform Regulation and Investment Attractiveness: A Look at the EU, the UK and Impacts on Small Open Economies

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Vanika Sharma, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Small trade- and investment-oriented economies like the United Kingdom (UK) should carefully consider whether to regulate online platform services based on presumptions rather than evidence that consumers are being harmed. Flimsily enforced platform regulation can have a chilling effect on investments in business expansion and innovation, particularly in technology-adopting industries. Several countries around the world are designing new competition policies that specifically target large digital platforms. The theory behind these policies is grey. There are political concerns about the impact of various aspects of platforms on society, especially regarding the collection and safety of data. However, practices that harm consumers – traditionally a key motivation of competition enforcement – are very rare. Indeed, the success stories of large tech platforms demonstrate that they offer strong benefits and conveniences to millions of business users across a wide range of industries. Marginal costs of supply, high-quality services, continuous technological advancements, and platforms’ ability to drive productivity growth have enabled especially small businesses to thrive and compete in domestic and international markets. Against this background, it is highly questionable why some governments, with the backing of power-seeking competition regulators, are aiming to legally interfere in services provided by large technology companies. An important consequence that has so far received little attention from policymakers and competition authorities is the impact of platform regulation on a country’s investment attractiveness. It is obvious that bans and restrictions on corporate conduct cause regulated companies to abstain from investments and establish new business elsewhere. What is less clear is the effect of regulation on investments by companies that extensively adopt platform services to reduce costs, speed-up innovation, and expand market opportunities. In this policy brief, we argue that access to integrated and internationally traded platform services is increasingly important for a country’s investment attractiveness, even more so for smaller countries. Access to advanced technologies and the utilisation of network effects create a virtuous cycle of economic opportunities, investments, value creation, and trade. Discretionary and presumption-based competition enforcement, as adopted in the EU, risks hurting smaller countries in particular. The EU has chosen the path of proscriptive and protective policymaking with the DMA to achieve industrial and trade policy goals rather than defending competition in the Single Market. UK competition policy risks being driven by institutional interests and ideological considerations, which could potentially lead to the adoption of a regulatory landscape that is even more restrictive than that of the EU, undermining Britain’s ambitions for economic and innovation leadership.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, Investment, Trade, and Online Platforms
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

8. The Impacts of EU Strategy Autonomy Policies – A Primer for Member States

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU governments should be much more sceptical and critical of the EU’s strategic autonomy agenda and the new polices intended to achieve the EU’s “long-term” industrial and technological ambitions. The long-term costs for Member States’ economies and the process of economic convergence are largely ignored by the agenda. Negative impacts of strategic autonomy on trade openness and the international rules-based trading system are also greatly understated. Many EU strategic autonomy ambitions are inherently guided by a “European Union First” impulse. Policymakers follow the assumption that EU values are superior to those in other parts of the world and EU regulation should be different from third countries. Major strategic autonomy aspirations represent a relapse of the EU to the old policy of EU member states designing and enforcing their own laws without considering the economic and political costs of regulatory fragmentation and economic disintegration from others. Recent strategic autonomy policies are estimated to create income losses in the EU of between 0.08% and 0.15% of EU27 GDP. These losses correspond to short-term economic harm resulting from changes in the use of productive resources in the EU. Long-run impacts, which reflect losses to productivity and innovation, could be up to 3 to 5 times higher with national income per capita falling by up to 0.5% to 0.75%. The costs are not evenly distributed across the EU27. Larger countries like France and Germany are less impacted than smaller ones, notably Ireland and the Baltic states. The impacts on Ireland, for example, are close to 4 times bigger than they are for France, the impacts on Estonia close to twice those on Germany. Strategic autonomy ambitions have failed to account for negative impacts on developing countries. To the extent that the EU’s policy stance further fragilizes rules-based multilateralism, there are longer-term impacts stemming from a less certain legal environment and higher barriers for cross-border trade and investment. EU strategic autonomy policies have the effect of empowering vested interests in developing countries to engage in lobbying for their own protectionist policies. Accordingly, EU strategic autonomy policies risk encouraging the diffusion of protectionist policies globally, particularly in countries with weak institutional capacity. EU Member States should examine their options and ask themselves whether there are better long-term strategies to pursue than those currently proposed at the EU level, strategies guided by the spirit of an open society – a society embracing the principles of free trade, non-discrimination, and economic freedom. Europe’s policymakers should aim for closer market integration and regulatory cooperation with trustworthy international partners such as the G7 and the larger group of the OECD countries. It is in the EU’s self-interest to advocate for a rules-based international order with open markets. It is neither in the EU’s economic nor its political interest to disintegrate from partner countries.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe