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1. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

2. The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: A Conversation with Matthew Kroenig

Author:
Matthew Kroenig and Dylan Land
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Matthew Kroenig is Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His latest book is The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the U.S. and China. Dr. Kroenig has served in several positions in the U.S. Department of Defense and the intelligence community in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, including in the Strategy, Middle East, and Nuclear and Missile Defense offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the CIA’s Strategic Assessments Group. Dr. Kroenig is also Director of the Global Strategy Initiative and Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

4. Mitigating the Security Risks Posed by a Near-Nuclear Iran

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
US President Barack Obama has called the international dispute over Iran's advanced nuclear program "one of the leading security challenges of our time." Fitting for a problem of this magnitude, analysts have thoroughly examined the major policy options for addressing the challenge, including most notably, diplomacy, containment, and military strikes. Lost in this focus on the broad policy options to prevent or deal with a nuclear-armed Iran, however, is the acknowledgement that Iran already possesses a latent nuclear weapons capability and that this capability poses several threats to international peace and security at present. Moreover, it is almost certain that Iran will retain such a capability in the short to medium term regardless of how the nuclear diplomacy progresses-and even if the international community and Iran agree to a "comprehensive" nuclear deal. Rather than an exclusive focus on broad strategies for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, therefore, it would also be prudent to identify and mitigate against the challenges posed by Iran's extant latent nuclear capability, a capability that will likely remain in place even if Washington's policy of prevention is successful.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Iran

5. Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters to NATO

Author:
Walter B. Slocombe and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO's Strategic Concept (SC), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, includes a number of propositions that define NATO's nuclear policy. Most fundamentally, NATO's most important strategy document declares that "[d]eterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of" the Alliance's "overall strategy."
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security

6. Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
What is the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics? The scholarly debate pits proliferation optimists, who claim that “more may be better,” against proliferation pessimists, who argue that “more will be worse.” These scholars focus on the aggregate effects of nuclear proliferation, but never explicitly consider the differential effects of the spread of nuclear weapons. In other words, they do not examine whether nuclear proliferation may threaten some states more than others. I propose a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. I argue that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state's ability to project military power. The spread of nuclear weapons is worse for states that have the ability to project conventional military power over a potential nuclear weapon state primarily because nuclear proliferation constrains their conventional military freedom of action. On the other hand, nuclear proliferation is less threatening to, and can sometimes even improve the strategic environment of, states that lack the ability to project power over a potential nuclear weapon state, because the spread of nuclear weapons disproportionately constrains other, more powerful states. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Affairs