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1. Tesla as a Global Competitor: Strategic Control in the EV Transition

Author:
Matt Hopkins and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
In this paper, we assess the implications of Elon Musk’s strategic control over Tesla, the pioneering company that has become central to the electric vehicle transition. We document how, as Tesla’s CEO for 16 years, Musk has exercised strategic control to direct the transformation of the company from an uncertain startup to a global leader. Now that Tesla is profitable corporate predators (aka hedge-fund activists) may challenge Musk’s strategic control—a possibility of which the CEO is well aware. To retain his control over Tesla as a publicly listed company, Musk depends on holding a sufficient proportion of Tesla’s shares outstanding to possess the voting power to fend off predatory value extractors. In addition to accumulating Tesla shares by investing $291.2 million at early stages of the company’s evolution, Musk has relied upon massive stock-option grants from the Tesla board, under the guise of “compensation”, in 2009, 2012, and 2018, to boost his shareholding and, with it, his voting power. Hence the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in January 2024 to rescind Musk’s 2018 stock-option package—by far the largest ever granted to a corporate executive—poses a threat to Musk’s strategic control at Tesla. As the “Technoking” of Tesla strategizes to maintain his control over the company’s decision-making, anyone concerned with the role that Tesla will play in the evolving EV transition should be asking how CEO Musk might use, or abuse, his powerful position.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economic Competition, Electric Vehicles, Tesla, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

2. Why the CHIPS Are Down: Stock Buybacks and Subsidies in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry

Author:
William Lazonick and Matt Hopkins
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) is promoting the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, introduced in Congress in June 2020. An SIA press release describes the bill as “bipartisan legislation that would invest tens of billions of dollars in semiconductor manufacturing incentives and research initiatives over the next 5-10 years to strengthen and sustain American leadership in chip technology, which is essential to our country’s economy and national security.” On June 8, 2021, the Senate approved $52 billion for the CHIPS for America Act, dedicated to supporting the U.S. semiconductor industry over the next decade. This paper highlights a curious paradox: Most of the SIA corporate members now lobbying for the CHIPS for America Act have squandered past support that the U.S. semiconductor industry has received from the U.S. government for decades by using their corporate cash to do buybacks to boost their own companies’ stock prices. Among the SIA corporate signatories of a letter to President Biden in February 2021, the five largest stock repurchasers—Intel, IBM, Qualcomm, Texas Instruments, and Broadcom—did a combined $249 billion in buybacks over the decade 2011-2020, equal to 71 percent of their profits and almost five times the subsidies over the next decade for which the SIA is lobbying. In addition, among the members of the Semiconductors in America Coalition (SIAC), formed specifically in May 2021 to lobby Congress for the passage of the CHIPS for America Act, are Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, and Google. These firms spent a combined $633 billion on buybacks during 2011-2020. That is about 12 times the government subsidies provided under the CHIPS for America Act to support semiconductor fabrication in the United States in the upcoming decade. If the Congress wants to achieve the legislation’s stated purpose of promoting major new investments in semiconductors, it needs to deal with this paradox. It could, for example, require the SIA and SIAC to extract pledges from its member corporations that they will cease doing stock buybacks as open-market repurchases over the next ten years. Such regulation could be a first step in rescinding Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-18, which has since 1982 been a major cause of extreme income inequality and loss of global industrial competitiveness in the United States.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Regulation, Legislation, Strategic Competition, Subsidies, and Lobbying
Political Geography:
United States of America