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1. The German Undervaluation Regime under Bretton Woods How Germany Became the Nightmare of the World Economy

Author:
Martin Höpner
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Germany is an undervaluation regime, a regime that steers economic behavior towards deterioration of the real exchange rate and thereby towards export surpluses. This regime has brought the eurozone to the brink of collapse. But it is much older than the euro. It was established during the Bretton Woods years and has survived all subsequent European currency orders. The regime operates in two steps: competitive disinflation against trading partners; and resistance against correcting revaluations. The Bretton Woods order provid- ed perfect conditions for the establishment and perpetuation of the regime: it was flexible enough for sufficient macroeconomic policy autonomy to bring about differential inflation rates, and sticky enough to delay and minimize revaluations.
Topic:
Political Economy, Regional Cooperation, Capitalism, and Inflation
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Central Europe

2. Warum betreibt der Europäische Gerichtshof Rechtsfortbildung? Die Politisierungshypothese

Author:
Martin Höpner
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Scholars from law, political science and sociology agree that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets European law extensively and that the Court has become an “engine of integration” that, de facto, conducts integration policy. On the basis of ten landmark ECJ decisions, this paper discusses whether the politicization hypothesis can help to explain this development. The politicization hypothesis posits that ECJ judges make their decisions based on the political interests of either the countries they come from or the parties they sympathize with. The party-based variant of the hypothesis does not seem to have any explanatory power. Similarly, the country-based variant delivers no systematic explanation that could supersede alternative explanations. However, the country-based variant fits quite well with some of the cases observed. I conclude that while situationally motivated acts of politicization may actually occur at the ECJ, which does not imply that the judicial code is being totally replaced by political considerations.
Topic:
International Law and Law
Political Geography:
Europe

3. A New Phase of European Integration:Organized Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe

Author:
Armin Schäfer and Martin Höpner
Publication Date:
03-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Research Papers Archive
Abstract:
In the past, economic integration in Europe was largely compatible with the persistence of different national varieties of capitalism. While product market integration intensified competition, member states could build on and foster their respective comparative advantage. To date, this no longer unequivocally holds true. We contend that a new, 'Post-Ricardian' phase of European integration has emerged in which the Commission's and the ECJ's attempts to further economic integration systematically challenge the institutions of organized capitalism. This quest for liberalization has reached a point at which its output legitimacy is increasingly uncertain. As a result, the de-politicization of EU decisions proves increasingly unsuccessful. In addition, liberalization measures rely on a very generous interpretations of the 'four freedoms' that exceeds the amount of liberalization the member states agreed upon in the European treaties and, therefore, lacks input legitimacy. We show this by discussing recent struggles over the Services Directive, the Takeover Directive, and company law. In the current phase of European integration, the Commission's and the ECJ's liberalization attempts either transform the institutional foundations on which some of the member states' economic systems rely or they create political resistance to an extent that calls into question the European project. The case studies reveal evidence for both of these possibilities.
Topic:
Development and Economics
Political Geography:
Europe

4. European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox

Author:
Martin Höpner
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
Abstract:
This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament's crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.
Topic:
Democratization, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

5. The Politics of the German Company Network

Author:
Martin Höpner and Lothar Krempel
Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
For over 100 years, the German company network was a major feature of organized corporate governance in Germany. This paper uses network visualization techniques and qualitative-historical analysis to discuss the structure, origins and development of this network and to analyze the reasons for its recent erosion. Network visualization makes it possible to identify crucial entanglement patterns that can be traced back historically. In three phases of network formation – the 1880s, 1920s and the 1950s –, capital entanglement resulted from the interplay of company behavior and government policy. In its heyday, the company network was de facto encompassing and provided its core participants, especially the banks, with a national, macroeconomic perspective. In the 1970s, a process of increased competition among financial companies set in. In the 1980s and 1990s, declining returns from blockholding and increased opportunity costs made network dissolution a thinkable option for companies. Because of the strategic reorientation of the largest banks toward investment banking, ties between banks and industry underwent functional changes. Since the year 2000, the German government's tax policy has sped up network erosion. Vanishing capital ties imply a declining degree of strategic coordination among large German companies.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany