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Begin New Search Topic Strategic Competition Author Martijn Rasser

1. Reboot: Framework for a New American Industrial Policy

Author:
Martijn Rasser, Megan Lamberth, Hannah Kelley, and Ryan Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This paper presents an initial framework for a new American industrial policy, a blueprint for what is needed to ensure the United States has the vision, goals, plans, and resources for an era of sustained strategic competition. The concept, informed by an overarching national technology strategy and a supply chain resilience strategy, is the initial contribution in a larger effort to provide policymakers with a comprehensive toolkit to navigate competition with China and engage with countries around the world, friend and foe alike.4 To provide tangible real-world examples of a new sensible American industrial policy and to illustrate how policies would vary by sector and over time, subsequent reports will detail what a new American industrial policy would look like in action for three key sectors: biotechnology, semiconductors, and green technologies.
Topic:
Economy, Green Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, Biotechnology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

2. When the Chips Are Down: Gaming the Global Semiconductor Competition

Author:
Becca Wasser, Martijn Rasser, and Hannah Kelley
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is in a strategic competition with a well-resourced and capable opponent. China seeks a global role that is broadly at odds with the strategic interests and values of America and fellow democracies. Technology, a key enabler of political, economic, and military power, is at the center of this competition. Within this competition, semiconductors loom large. Chips are a driving force for breakthroughs in a range of critical technology areas, from AI to synthetic biology to quantum computing. Semiconductors are essential to the military systems used by the United States and its allies and partners to defend themselves and their interests. At a fundamental level, the day-to-day functioning of modern society hinges on dependable access to chips; critical infrastructure, transportation networks, and digital communication cannot function without them. Semiconductor supply chains form an intricate global web, with several countries and companies serving as important nodes. Some of these nodes have such outsized importance that any disruption would have significant and detrimental cascading effects for U.S. national and economic security. Taiwan is the central node in the semiconductor supply chain. Home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest contract chip foundry, more than half of the world’s outsourced semiconductor manufacturing and nearly all leading-edge manufacturing capacity is in Taiwan. Secure access to the output of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is therefore a strategic necessity. Yet, while policymakers understand the critical importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, the myriad of factors and nuances essential to developing policies and plans that protect its integrity, mitigate risk, and reduce second-order consequences are insufficiently studied.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. From Plan to Action: Operationalizing a U.S. National Technology Strategy

Author:
John Costello, Martijn Rasser, and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Ideas abound for actions the United States should take to better position itself for the unfolding global technology competition. Concerning topics as diverse as raw materials to semiconductors to STEM education, a nonstop cavalcade of presidential directives, congressional bills, industry proposals, think tank reports, and pronouncements by big-name luminaries have been issued as measures to address American economic competitiveness and national security challenges. Almost all make their case in the context of dealing with a rising China. Some of these recommendations are excellent and quite a few are good; too many get lost in the noise. It’s not just the sheer volume that presents a challenge to identifying and executing the most promising recommendations. The U.S. government lacks a strategic construct to merge these ideas—for research and development spending, public-private partnerships, tax policy and subsidies, immigration reform, and education—into a coherent whole. The goal of CNAS’ National Technology Strategy project is to create the framework for a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach for the United States to navigate the global technology competition. The first report in this initiative, “Taking the Helm,” makes the case for a national technology strategy and lays out what such a modern-day strategy should be.1 Its chief argument is that the United States is in a long-term, multifaceted geostrategic competition with China, one that has technology at its core. Technological leadership is more important than ever, yet current U.S. government policies fall well short of what is needed to maintain it. Crafting an affirmative technology policy agenda is not just about competing with China; it comprises the guiding principles for the nation’s technology policy goals and priorities to pursue economic prosperity, protect national security interests and democratic values, and advance society. How the U.S. government should structure itself organizationally and bureaucratically to execute such a strategy is the focus of the second report, “Trust the Process.”2 Today, key institutions such as the National Security Council, National Economic Council, and Office of Science and Technology Policy are not optimized to craft, run, and maintain this effort. “Trust the Process” explains what talent, resources, infrastructure, and processes are needed for strategy development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. This third report in the series focuses on concrete and pragmatic measures that U.S. policymakers should take to operationalize a national technology strategy. There are four premises to the security and technology competition that guide these findings: the utility of industrial policies, the convergence of national and economic security, gaps in knowledge, and the need for international partnerships. The report offers recommendations for specific changes to U.S. government departmental and agency authorities, regulatory updates, policy initiatives, and diplomatic efforts that will bolster the U.S. government's ability to craft, execute, and maintain this strategy.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Edge Networks, Core Policy: Securing America's 6G Future

Author:
Martijn Rasser, Ainikki Riikonen, and Henry Wu
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Technological leadership by the United States requires forethought and organization. The plan necessary to maintain that leadership—a national technology strategy—should be broad in scope. Its range includes investments in research, nurturing human talent, revamping government offices and agencies, and ensuring that laws, regulations, and incentives provide private industry with the ability and opportunity to compete fairly and effectively on the merits of their products, capabilities, and know-how. Given that key inputs are diffused globally, this plan must also carefully consider how the United States can effectively partner with other tech-leading democracies for mutual economic and security benefit. This includes taking measures to promote norms for technology use that align with shared values. In the context of strategic competition with China, the need to craft new approaches to technology development and deployment is increasingly apparent to government leaders. Many lawmakers grasped the stark reality that U.S. technological preeminence was eroding when they realized that China had become a global juggernaut in telecommunications, a situation exacerbated by Beijing’s push to dominate global fifth generation (5G) wireless networks. The state of play poses national and economic security risks to the United States, which, along with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, has made notable headway in addressing and mitigating these risks. However, much work remains. Chinese firms continue to push for greater digital entanglement around the world, from Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America. Given the fundamental importance to the digital economy of communications networks and the standards that govern them, the more successful Beijing’s policies are, the greater the challenge for tech-leading democracies to maintain their economic competitiveness. There is also the specter of norms. If these are dominated by illiberal actors, their power to shape how networks are used and to manipulate data flows poses threats to liberal democratic values the world over.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Norms, Strategic Competition, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

5. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, ​Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific