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Begin New Search Publishing Institution James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Author Leonard Spector

1. he Other Fissile Material: Strengthening National and International Plutonium Management Approaches

Author:
John Carlson, Leonard Spector, and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Occasional Paper #42 discusses issues relating to separated, or unirradiated, plutonium in civilian nuclear programs, that is, plutonium that has been chemically separated from spent nuclear reactor fuel by reprocessing but has not been reintroduced into a nuclear reactor after separation and subjected to further irradiation. Efforts to limit the spread of reprocessing in the civilian sector crystalized in the mid-1970s. Two developments triggered the intensified attention to this issue: (1) India’s 1974 test of a nuclear explosive device, which used as its core plutonium produced in an ostensibly peaceful nuclear-research program, and (2) attempts on the part of several states that had not renounced nuclear weapons to obtain reprocessing plants for their civil nuclear power programs. In the intervening forty-four years, in those states that proceeded with civilian reprocessing programs, stocks of separated civilian plutonium have continued to grow in the aggregate. Taken together today, they are substantially greater than worldwide military plutonium stocks. Multiple approaches to limiting the separation of civil plutonium have been implemented, and still others have been given serious study, but stocks have increased regardless, while options for working down these stocks appear to be diminishing. Meanwhile, concern has deepened over the possible theft or diversion of this material, which could bring weapon-sufficient quantities of plutonium into the hands of violent extremists. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are valuable, but they do not fully address the risks of breakout from nonproliferation or disarmament commitments. Safeguards are intended to provide timely warning of diversion, so as to provide an opportunity for intervention. However, even if diversion of plutonium is detected immediately, the plutonium could be weaponized too quickly for effective preventive measures. Nor are safeguards designed to address nuclear-material security issues. Accordingly, there is a need for institutional and technical measures to mitigate risks from separated plutonium. This report recommends steps to address the risks posed by existing reprocessing programs and stocks as well as ways to discourage potential new programs.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Governance, Nuclear Power, and Mining
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Countering North Korean Procurement Networks Through Financial Measures: The Role of Southeast Asia

Author:
Eda Erol and Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
This Occasional Paper is made up of four studies intended to aid Southeast Asian governments and financial institutions in their efforts to counter the financing of weapon of mass destruction programs in North Korea and other states of concern. “Countering North Korean Procurement Networks through Financial Measures: The Role of Southeast Asia,” highlights how North Korea has exploited weak financial controls in the region to advance its nuclear and missile programs. The study reviews Security Council and Financial Action Task Force actions to combat such abuse of the international banking system, as well as the role of US sanctions. Effective implementation of these measures in Southeast Asia, the study concludes, could contribute significantly to constraining North Korea and other proliferant states. “Needed Next Steps to Strengthen Measures to Counter Proliferation Finance,” identifies gaps in international measures to combat proliferation finance, and calls on the Security Council and the Financial Action Task Force to clarify standards for national-level implementation of counter-proliferation-finance rules and to adopt improved enforcement mechanisms. The analysis urges Southeast Asian governments and financial institutions to implement existing measures with greater vigor. “Chinpo Shipping: A Singaporean Financial Agent of North Korea” details how North Korea created an off-shore de facto bank to finance its illegal activities and how Singapore’s courts addressed the first known prosecution for financing proliferation. The case underscores that greater due diligence by banks and regulatory authorities is urgently needed. Finally, “Due Diligence and the Panama Papers Episode: Lessons for Proliferation Finance,” shows how a North Korean bank, denied access to the international banking system, set up an off-shore entity to transact its business. The analysis calls for greatly strengthened enforcement efforts by offshore tax havens, closer scrutiny of clients by banks and law firms conducting international business, and greater efforts by Southeast Asian governments to block sanctions-violating front companies from accessing their banking systems.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Illegal Trade, Procurement, and Banking
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3. Outlawing State-Sponsored Nuclear Procurement Programs & Recovery of Misappropriated Nuclear Goods

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
State-sponsored illicit nuclear-procurement activities have played a crucial role in advancing the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea and will undoubtedly be used by the next country that seeks to pursue a nuclear-weapon capability. Such repeated state-sponsored abuse of other states’ export-control systems undermines a key objective of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which requires all states to adopt such controls. However, as this study details, this dangerous conduct has never been condemned as a distinct offense against international norms and rules sufficient to trigger sanctions or other punitive action against the offending state. This study proposes to outlaw state-sponsored illicit nuclear-procurement programs through the accretion of declarations by international and multilateral bodies condemning this conduct and expressing the intention to consider punitive measures in future cases where this conduct is observed. Even if consensus on such a declaration cannot be reached in every relevant forum, repeated, well-publicized demands for such action by a group of diplomatically influential aggrieved states can have a significant deterrent effect. Importantly, with illicit procurement activities often serving as an early indication of a clandestine nuclear-weapon program, establishing this activity as an offense against international norms would set the stage for early, concerted action against the next offending state, well before its nuclear program might approach its goal.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Illegal Trade, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. The Future Impact of North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. In a new paper (published by the US-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, on its website, 38north) CNS’s Leonard S. Spector examines the arenas in which North Korea’s new nuclear weapon status has significant negative consequences and assesses the damage that will likely be done. He concludes that the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

5. Countering Nuclear Commodity Smuggling: A System of Systems

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
A comprehensive Center for Nonproliferation Studies report calls on the United States and other concerned countries to adopt tighter controls to stem the flow of nuclear-related goods to Iran, North Korea, and other states of proliferation concern. Even modest improvements across the spectrum of today’s nuclear technology controls could greatly strengthen overall international efforts to constrain illicit nuclear procurement networks, the study found. The now available report, Countering Nuclear Commodity Smuggling: A System of Systems, was prepared by Leonard S. Spector and Egle Murauskaite. The study was supported by the US Department of Defense.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea