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Begin New Search Topic Ideology Author John Dotson

1. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 2: The New Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 29, 2023, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a gathering of People’s Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic personnel in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. He instructed his audience to compose a “diplomatic iron army (外交铁军)” representing China’s interests. Notably, Xi emphasized the need for correct political thinking: asserting that they must “persist in our revolution (坚持自我革命),” “be steadfast in political conviction (政治信念坚定),” and “build a sturdy ideological line of defense (筑牢思想防线)” about themselves in the performance of their work (Yang Guang Wang, December 30, 2023). These comments are the latest example of an extensive series of efforts by the CCP leadership in late 2023 to reinforce ideological regimentation within the Party. On October 16, 2023, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a new document titled the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027) [全国干部教育培训规划 (2023-2027年)] (hereafter “2023 Cadre Plan”), which laid out extensive new requirements for ideological study on the part of CCP officials (PRC Government, October 16, 2023). This move had been signaled at a CCP Politburo meeting at the end of August, which was reportedly convened to deliberate on new draft documents related to ideological training for Party members. The official coverage of the August meeting emphasized that forthcoming Party directives would further scrutinize “political judgment (政治判断力)”—signifying loyalty and obedience to the central Party leadership—and “strengthen political gatekeeping (加强政治把关)” for cadre reliability (PRC Government, August 31, 2023).
Topic:
Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 1: The PRC’s New “Patriotic Education Law”

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On October 24, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (全国人民代表大会常务委) officially codified the country’s existing initiatives for “patriotic education (PE; 爱国主义教育)” by promulgating the People’s Republic of China Patriotic Education Law (中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法). This mandates indoctrination in state-directed ideological content throughout all sectors of society (PRC Government, October 25). While CCP policy documents are always more important than formal PRC law, the Party-state does use formal laws passed by the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会) to codify and emphasize Party policies. This law appears to be no exception. [1] The unveiling of the new Patriotic Education Law has been accompanied by a campaign of predictably laudatory coverage in PRC state media. For example, the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily ran a flowery editorial that quoted a professor from the China University of Political Science and Law as stating that “implementing the patriotic education law will enhance the daily practice of patriotic spirit” among the Chinese people. The editorial itself opined that the NPC had, “on the basis of the rule of law, promoted and guaranteed New Era patriotic education, inspiring the nation’s spirit, concentrating the people’s strength, advancing the building of a strong country [and] national revival with extremely significant and profound meaning” (People’s Daily, November 23). Such coverage has appeared alongside other official messaging emphasizing the need for enhanced focus on ideological instruction. For example, the mid-October issue of the CCP’s official journal Qiushi (求实) was a themed issue focused on ideology. It featured a lead article under Xi’s name titled “Open New Frontiers for the Sinicization and Modernization of Marxism.” It also included a list of articles on supporting themes, such as a Central Party School article titled “In the New Era and New Journey, Unceasingly Advance the Party’s Innovations in Theory” (Qiushi, October 16).
Topic:
Education, Law, Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. The CCP’s Renewed Focus on Ideological Indoctrination, Part 1: The 2019 Guidelines for “Patriotic Education”

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
This is the first part of a two-part briefing series that will address new directives issued in November 2019 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the field of ideological “education.” This first part examines a new set of directives for intensified “patriotic education,” which is intended to indoctrinate Chinese youth—as well as Chinese society as a whole—with loyalty to the ruling Party. The second part, to appear in our next issue, will examine a new five-year plan recently unveiled by the CCP for ideological training among its own cadres.
Topic:
Education, Youth, Protests, and Ideology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

4. The CCP’s Renewed Focus on Ideological Conditioning, Part 2: The New Five-Year Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as a cautionary example, and party organs have produced books and films that warn of the dire consequences that would follow from any steps to loosen the CCP’s grip on the economy, public discourse, or political power. These materials have been made the focus of mandatory study under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping (SCMP, November 18, 2013). Alongside alleged villains such as the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev, ideological laxity among Soviet Communist Party members has been identified as a key factor in the downfall of the Soviet state. [1] To address this, the CCP leadership has undertaken concerted efforts throughout 2019 to bolster ideological indoctrination among its own membership. Party members have been made subject to mandatory use of the smartphone app Xuexi Qiangguo (学习强国), which was introduced in January of this year. [2] Users are required to meet quotas of “study points” for spending time on the app, reading and commenting on articles, and taking tests about party policies (SCMP, February 14, 2019). In addition to serving as a channel for ideological indoctrination, the app also serves as a surveillance tool: it both “collects and sends detailed app log reports on a daily basis, containing a wealth of user data and app activity,” and contains “code that amounts to a backdoor to rooted devices… granting complete administrator-level access to a user’s phone” (Open Technology Fund, September 12). The CCP’s current official ideology is “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想, Xi Jinping Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang). This ideological program is grounded in Xi’s ever-growing cult of personality, and relies heavily on the dogmatic repetition of slogans rather than clearly articulated ideas. In broad terms, it strikes three general themes: (1) achieving the “China Dream” (中国梦, Zhongguo Meng) of restored national greatness; (2) unyielding CCP control over politics and Chinese society; and (3) continuing reforms in party-state institutions and governance. The latter element is often expressed in terms of greater centralization of power at the top echelons of the CCP, and demands for stricter personal loyalty to Xi Jinping (China Brief, November 19). [3]
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Ideology, and State Building
Political Geography:
China and Asia