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Begin New Search Topic Governance Author Jeromin Zettelmeyer

1. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:
Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

2. Rebooting the European Union’s Net Zero Industry Act

Author:
Simone Tagliapietra, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In March 2023, the European Commission published a legislative proposal for an EU response to the US Inflation Reduction Act: the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA). It is an unconvincing policy proposal, both for what is in it and for what is not in it. The proposal has five problematic aspects. First, it takes a top-down approach, in which specific technologies are selected for preferential treatment. Preferable would be a technology-neutral approach open to all current and future technologies that help tackle the net-zero challenge. Second, its blanket 40 percent self-sufficiency benchmark for EU domestic cleantech manufacturing by 2030 sends a protectionist signal, is poorly defined and does not reflect the differences in EU capacity in the cleantech sector. Third, it relies on the acceleration of permitting procedures as the main policy instrument, although this is not the main obstacle to cleantech investment in the EU. Fourth, it proposes more strategic use of public procurement. While this is an objective to be supported, the specific proposals are likely to be ineffective because of the way they are designed. Fifth and not least, the NZIA would lack a governance structure that would ensure effective implementation. In addition, the NZIA does not tackle three critical issues. It does not address investment obstacles related to failures of the single market. It does not tackle the coordination problem at the core of developing an EU green industrial policy. Finally, it does not develop an EU-level funding strategy, but rather relies on state aid, with the related risk of fragmentation. The European Parliament and EU countries in the Council of the EU should reboot the proposal and refocus its objectives, sharpening its limited instruments, improving its governance, and adding financial incentives to ensure implementation. In parallel, the EU should develop a broader green industrial policy strategy that leverages the single market in a credible manner, building a solid new governance framework and a new EU-level funding approach.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Trade Policy, and Industry
Political Geography:
Europe

3. The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union

Author:
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

4. How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
David Kleimann, Niclas Poitiers, André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra, Nicolas Veron, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The 2022 United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a significant and welcome climate law. It also includes trade-distortive subsidies, including local-content requirements prohibited under World Trade Organisation rules – the first time the US has done this and a blow to the international trading system that could trigger protectionism in other countries. The expected IRA green subsidies are of similar size to those available in the European Union, except in renewable energy production, where EU subsidies remain far larger. However, there are important qualitative differences. Some IRA subsidies discriminate against foreign producers while EU subsidies do not. IRA clean-tech subsidies are simpler and less fragmented, and they focus mainly on mass deployment of green technologies rather than innovation. The IRA will likely harm Europe through its competitiveness effect, while it will likely benefit climate transition in Europe and most of the rest of the world. However, the magnitude of both effects is very uncertain, partly because the IRA will induce substitution away from Chinese inputs. By forcing the reorganisation of supply chains, the IRA may make the EU and other economies more competitive relative to China. It may also initially slow the green transition. But in the longer run, this effect should be outweighed by the reduction in the cost of clean tech driven by the IRA. In responding to the IRA, the EU should not just seek to protect its competitiveness relative to the US but to pursue broader aims, including competitiveness in general, speedy decarbonisation and broad foreign policy and development policy goals. These aims imply that the EU should not impose local-content requirements of its own, should not loosen state-aid rules and should not mimic the IRA’s approach to manufacturing subsidies. Rather, it should focus on boosting its structural competitiveness, formulate a trade policy response that includes reform of the international subsidies regime, and develop an instrument for EU-level subsidies that focuses on early-stage development and increasing EU resilience to trade disruptions.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Inflation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

5. A quantitative evaluation of the European Commission’s fiscal governance proposal

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the new European Union fiscal framework proposed by the European Commission in April 2023, medium-term fiscal adjustment requirements would be determined by country-by-country debt sustainability analysis (DSA), the 3 percent deficit ceiling and simple rules requiring minimum deficit and debt adjustments (‘safeguards’). These elements are controversial, with some EU countries (and ourselves) preferring a DSA-based approach, while others prefer to stick to simple rules. This paper evaluates the proposal by replicating the DSA methodology and computing fiscal adjustment implications for all EU countries with debt above 60 percent or deficits above 3 percent of GDP. We find that the proposed framework would require ambitious fiscal adjustment: on average, more than 2 percent of GDP over the medium term, in addition to the adjustment that is already planned for 2023-24. However, for most high-debt countries, these requirements are below those implied by the current framework. We also find that for most countries with debt above 60 percent of GDP, these adjustment requirements are driven by the DSA rather than the safeguards, but with significant exceptions. The main exception is France, for which the ‘debt safeguard’ – which requires debt to fall within four years – imposes much higher fiscal adjustment than the DSA. If the adjustment period were to be extended from four to seven years (as is possible under the framework for countries that submit growth-enhancing reform and investment plans), the safeguards would also be binding for several other countries. In addition, a requirement to reduce the deficit by at least half a percent per year if it exceeds 3 percent of GDP could become binding ex post, in response to output shocks, even if countries implement the fiscal adjustment required ex ante. Finally, we find that while the Commission’s DSA methodology is reasonable, it would benefit from review. This should be done by an independent expert group in consultation with the Commission, member states and other stakeholders, and endorsed by the Council. We recommend the endorsement of the Commission’s proposal after ambiguous aspects are clarified, the debt safeguard and other safeguards are removed or modified, the excessive deficit procedure is reformed to avoid procyclical adjustment, and a process for reviewing the DSA methodology is put in place.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Fiscal Policy, and European Commission
Political Geography:
Europe