Search

Begin New Search Topic Fiscal Policy Author Jeromin Zettelmeyer

1. The implications of the European Union’s new fiscal rules

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European Union countries are required by the EU Treaty to keep their budget deficits within 3 percent of GDP, and their public debt within 60 percent of GDP. A new framework to enforce these rules is based on country-specific debt sustainability analyses (DSA) and uses a single indicator, a measure of public expenditure, as the annual fiscal policy target. These changes are welcome. To assess the sustainability of public finances, it is much better to focus on the likely evolution of the debt path than to rely on simple numerical rules. Public expenditures net of changes to tax policy are a far better target for fiscal policy than the deficit, since they are under the control of the government and cannot give rise to pro-cyclical fiscal policy (excess spending in good times, fiscal cuts in bad times). These features could increase the framework’s efficiency and improve compliance. However, the new framework also contains numerical safeguards to ensure a minimum pace of debt and deficit reduction. These might overwrite the DSA-based requirements and could undermine the rationale for the new rules and the incentives for compliance. The safeguards could also introduce some pro-cyclicality and, more importantly, could hold back increases in public investment. Our calculations show that the new framework will require ambitious fiscal adjustments from high-debt countries, though less than would have been required by the previous framework. Numerical safeguards will not be a significant constraint in the first application of the framework in 2024, except in the case of Finland. In the next application, in 2028, they imply for France and Italy greater fiscal adjustment than required by the DSA and the 3 percent benchmark. There is ambiguity about the consistency of the new fiscal rules and the largely-unchanged excessive deficit procedure (EDP), and whether proposed reforms and investment will influence the DSA. This could interfere with the successful application of the framework. We recommend that the EDP should require the same adjustment as the DSA, a method- ology should be developed to estimate the quantitative impact of proposed investments and reforms, and the DSA methodology should be revised. In case EU countries’ investment plans on aggregate do not fill the green public-investment gap, we recommend a new EU facility to foster such investments.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Investment, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Incorporating the impact of social investments and reforms in the European Union’s new fiscal framework

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union’s new fiscal framework aims to incentivise public investment and reforms by offering the option to extend the four-year fiscal adjustment period to seven years, thereby lowering the average annual fiscal adjustment requirement. EU countries can propose investment and reforms in the context of their national medium-term fiscal structural plans. When they do, these investments and reforms can be expected to also inform the fiscal adjustment proposed by member states. Yet, the EU lacks an agreed methodology for deciding on the potential quantitative impact of investment and reforms on the fiscal adjustment required under the new rules. This paper first analyses the ‘investment friendliness’ of the new framework. Although the incentives offered for raising investment are powerful, the bar for extending the adjustment period mainly through higher investment is high, and the design of the new rules will make it hard to actually raise investment. We next propose an approach for quantifying the impact of investment and reform on debt sustainability in the context of the new framework, taking into account uncertainty about their implementation and their economic effects. Such a methodology would also help the European Commission evaluate the impacts of recently adopted measures, the impacts of which are not yet observable. Developing this methodology will require revisiting the current commonly agreed methodologies for medium- and long-term capital stock and total factor productivity projections. We illustrate the potential impact of investment on debt sustainability analyses through calculations on three social investment measures, that is, combinations of reform and public spending that aim to increase human capital and labour force participations. While the impact of individual reforms on fiscal adjustment needs is generally modest, the combined impact of several measures could be notable.
Topic:
Reform, European Union, Fiscal Policy, Public Investment, and Social Investment
Political Geography:
Europe

3. The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union

Author:
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

4. A quantitative evaluation of the European Commission’s fiscal governance proposal

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the new European Union fiscal framework proposed by the European Commission in April 2023, medium-term fiscal adjustment requirements would be determined by country-by-country debt sustainability analysis (DSA), the 3 percent deficit ceiling and simple rules requiring minimum deficit and debt adjustments (‘safeguards’). These elements are controversial, with some EU countries (and ourselves) preferring a DSA-based approach, while others prefer to stick to simple rules. This paper evaluates the proposal by replicating the DSA methodology and computing fiscal adjustment implications for all EU countries with debt above 60 percent or deficits above 3 percent of GDP. We find that the proposed framework would require ambitious fiscal adjustment: on average, more than 2 percent of GDP over the medium term, in addition to the adjustment that is already planned for 2023-24. However, for most high-debt countries, these requirements are below those implied by the current framework. We also find that for most countries with debt above 60 percent of GDP, these adjustment requirements are driven by the DSA rather than the safeguards, but with significant exceptions. The main exception is France, for which the ‘debt safeguard’ – which requires debt to fall within four years – imposes much higher fiscal adjustment than the DSA. If the adjustment period were to be extended from four to seven years (as is possible under the framework for countries that submit growth-enhancing reform and investment plans), the safeguards would also be binding for several other countries. In addition, a requirement to reduce the deficit by at least half a percent per year if it exceeds 3 percent of GDP could become binding ex post, in response to output shocks, even if countries implement the fiscal adjustment required ex ante. Finally, we find that while the Commission’s DSA methodology is reasonable, it would benefit from review. This should be done by an independent expert group in consultation with the Commission, member states and other stakeholders, and endorsed by the Council. We recommend the endorsement of the Commission’s proposal after ambiguous aspects are clarified, the debt safeguard and other safeguards are removed or modified, the excessive deficit procedure is reformed to avoid procyclical adjustment, and a process for reviewing the DSA methodology is put in place.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Fiscal Policy, and European Commission
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Redesigning EU fiscal rules: From rules to standards

Author:
Olivier Blanchard, Alvaro Leandro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The European Union’s fiscal rules have been suspended until at least the end of 2021. When they are reinstated, they will need to be modified, if only because of the high levels of debt. Proposals have been made—and more are to come—suggesting various changes and simplifications. Blanchard, Leandro, and Zettelmeyer take a step back and discuss how one should think about debt sustainability in the current and likely future EU economic environment. They argue that, given the complexity of the answer, it is an illusion to think that EU fiscal rules can be simple. But it is also an illusion to think that they can ever be complex enough to accommodate most relevant contingencies. Instead, the authors propose abandoning fiscal rules in favor of fiscal standards, i.e., qualitative prescriptions that leave room for judgment together with a process to decide whether the standards are met. Central to this process would be country-specific assessments using stochastic debt sustainability analysis, led by national independent fiscal councils and/or the European Commission. Disputes between member states and the European Commission on application of the standards should preferably be adjudicated by an independent institution, such as the European Court of Justice (or a specialized chamber), rather than by the Council of the European Union.
Topic:
European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Deficit
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Creating a Euro Area Safe Asset without Mutualizing Risk (Much)

Author:
Alvaro Leandro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
This paper explains and evaluates three proposals to create “safe assets” for the euro area based on sovereign bonds, in which sovereign risk is limited through diversification and some form of seniority. These assets would be held by banks and other financial institutions, replacing concentrated exposures to their own sovereigns. The paper focuses on three ideas: (1) to create multitranche “sovereign bond-backed securities” (SBBS), of which the senior tranche would constitute a safe asset; (2) to create a senior, publicly owned financial intermediary that would issue a bond backed by a diversified portfolio of sovereign loans (“E-bonds”); and (3) to issue sovereign bonds in several tranches and induce banks to hold a diversified pool of senior sovereign bonds (“multitranche national bond issuance”). Public attention (including public criticism) has so far focused on the first idea; the other two have not yet been seriously debated. The authors find that none of the competing proposals entirely dominates the others. SBBS do not deserve most of the criticism to which they have been subjected. At the same time, E-bonds and multitranche national bond issuance have several interesting features—including inducing fiscal discipline—and warrant further exploration.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Integration, Risk, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe