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Begin New Search Political Geography Middle East Author Ishac Diwan

1. Lebanon: Managing COVID-19 in the Time of Revolution

Author:
Ishac Diwan and Joelle M. Abi-Rached
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic in Lebanon is a crisis within a crisis. It occurred amidst a broader socio-economic meltdown that has shaken the country in recent months. While Lebanon appears to have responded effectively to the pandemic so far, a number of major challenges await it. With little measures to mitigate the economic impact of the confinement and protesters pushing to return to the streets, the country is entering an extremely volatile period. The only way out will be through measures that address the sanitary as well as underlying socio-economic issues that are threatening the entire country.
Topic:
Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

2. Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt

Author:
Ishac Diwan, Philip Keefer, and Marc Schiffbauer
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Using an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, we explore the economic effects of cronyism. Previous research has shown that cronyism is lucrative. We address numerous questions raised by this research. First, do crony firms receive favorable regulatory treatment? We find that they do: connected firms are more likely to benefit from trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and regulatory enforcement. Second, does regulatory capture account for the high value of connected firms? In our sample, connected firms exhibit superior corporate performance relative to unconnected firms and this is systematically related to regulatory capture. Energy subsidies and trade protection, for example, account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Third, do crony firms hurt growth? We exploit a natural experiment setting to show that the entry of politically connected firms into previously unconnected sectors slows employment growth and skews the distribution of employment towards less productive smaller firms.
Topic:
Economics, Economy, Business, Networks, and Cronyism
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt