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Begin New Search Political Geography Egypt Author Ishac Diwan

1. Egypt after the Coronavirus: Back to Square One

Author:
Ishac Diwan, Nadim Houry, and Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Egypt’s recent security and macro-economic stabilization has been built on weak foundations and Covid-19 has further exposed this fragility. Egypt is now back to a situation broadly similar to that before the 2011 revolution: stable on the surface, but with deep structural problems and simmering social grievances, and little buffers to mitigate them. This paper argues for a major shift in the ways the country is currently governed in favour of greater openness in politics and markets, and for the international community to seriously engage Egypt on the need to reform economically and politically.
Topic:
Security, Arab Spring, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa and Egypt

2. Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt

Author:
Ishac Diwan, Philip Keefer, and Marc Schiffbauer
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Using an original database of 469 politically connected firms under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, we explore the economic effects of cronyism. Previous research has shown that cronyism is lucrative. We address numerous questions raised by this research. First, do crony firms receive favorable regulatory treatment? We find that they do: connected firms are more likely to benefit from trade protection, energy subsidies, access to land, and regulatory enforcement. Second, does regulatory capture account for the high value of connected firms? In our sample, connected firms exhibit superior corporate performance relative to unconnected firms and this is systematically related to regulatory capture. Energy subsidies and trade protection, for example, account for the higher profits of politically connected firms. Third, do crony firms hurt growth? We exploit a natural experiment setting to show that the entry of politically connected firms into previously unconnected sectors slows employment growth and skews the distribution of employment towards less productive smaller firms.
Topic:
Economics, Economy, Business, Networks, and Cronyism
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt