1. Who Protects Whom? Politicians, Police and the Regulation of Drug Trafficking in Argentina
- Author:
- Hernan Flom
- Publication Date:
- 01-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kellogg Institute for International Studies
- Abstract:
- In many developing countries with weak formal institutions, sectors within the state protect organized criminal activities, allowing illicit markets to thrive. This article posits that how state actors regulate drug trafficking affects the levels of violence associated with such criminal activity. I argue that political competition influences coordination within the police and leads to different types of regulatory regimes. On the one hand, coordinated forces implement protection rackets that contain violence. On the other, uncoordinated police carry out particularistic negotiations with drug traffickers that exacerbate criminal violence. I illustrate this argument with a subnational comparison of two Argentine provinces, Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, during a period in which both witnessed a surge in drug trafficking but only one (Santa Fe) suffered a dramatic increase in criminal violence. These cases show how corrupt states can obtain relative order in highly fragmented drug markets, and how the police shape the evolution of drug dealing in metropolitan areas.
- Topic:
- Security, Corruption, Democracy, Social Justice, Violence, Public Policy, and Institutions
- Political Geography:
- Argentina and South America