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1. Upgrading Europe's electricity grid is about more than just money

Author:
Conall Heussaff and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Electricity network investment is essential for the energy transition, with annual investments of tens of billions of euros required across Europe. Network companies are already investing such amounts and delivering efficient grid investments requires more than additional money. Assessing infrastructure needs is the first step in grid investment. At local, national and European Union levels, network development planning is determined by policy choices and can greatly affect the efficiency of investments. Coordinated grid planning is crucial to set the right incentives for the efficient development of the European electricity system. An EU independent system operator could assume responsibility for network planning by providing regular, independent assessment of efficient network investment needs from a holistic European perspective. Although significant capital expenditure is undoubtedly necessary, network regulation should encourage network companies to invest in the most-efficient solutions. Current regulatory approaches may favour traditional capital expenditure, leading to system inefficiencies and higher-than-necessary consumer costs. Cross-border electricity transmission infrastructure is critical to integrate renewables into the electricity system at scale and reduce costs for European consumers. But such projects are often not built or are delayed because those that decide on and pay for the infrastructure are not necessarily those that benefit from it. A European fund could smooth negotiations between parties and accelerate the physical interconnection of the European electricity system. Fairly recovering the costs of grid investments from consumers is vital to maintain public support for the energy transition. National funds could smooth out cost impacts over time, keeping electricity affordable throughout the energy transition.
Topic:
Climate Change, Electricity, Decarbonization, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Who should be charged? Principles for fair allocation of electricity system costs

Author:
Conall Heussaff, Eva Jüngling, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The high costs in the European Union of supplying electricity can only be structurally reduced through decarbonisation and deeper European electricity system integration. In the short-term, policymakers have few choices. They can redistribute system costs by shifting components from one consumer to another. Another immediate distributional option would be to reduce energy taxation, implicitly shifting costs to the taxpayer. Meanwhile, decision-making processes that translates electricity system costs into final consumer prices are fragmented. Rules on the short-term production, transmission and consumption of electricity are determined at EU level. National regulators and governments determine how the fixed costs of the system are recovered from consumers, while national policymakers also set energy taxes. This Policy Brief sets out options for shifting the fixed costs of the electricity system between consumers, for changing energy taxation to reduce prices and for evaluating systemic trade-offs between system cost and other characteristics, such as sustainability and reliability. We also estimate the quantitative effects of shifting costs between consumers and reducing taxes on electricity. We set out four principles for pricing electricity fairly. Policy interventions in the electricity system should not seek to achieve broader economic objectives at the expense of energy-policy goals. Consumer prices should incentivise efficient system operation. Carbon emissions should be priced in. The fixed costs of the electricity system should be primarily recovered from inelastic consumption. European policymakers should develop transparent analytical tools to assess the distributional effects of electricity-policy interventions. Lessons should be learned from the energy crisis, during which EU and national policies attempted to shield consumers from price impacts, and these lessons should form the basis of ongoing efforts to reduce prices. EU guidelines for electricity cost recovery should be established, following fundamental economic principles, and could form a policy toolbox for national governments to reduce energy prices. Finally, the long-term strategic goal of deeper physical and institutional integration of the European electricity should be pursued to structurally reduce electricity prices.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Electricity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

3. The changing dynamics of European electricity markets and the supply-demand mismatch risk

Author:
Conall Heussaff and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Meeting Europe’s 2030 climate targets will require massive clean-electricity investment. To facilitate these investments, state-backed de-risking schemes such as contracts for difference (CfDs) are needed. Their role in supporting renewables has been consolidated by the European Union’s recently agreed electricity market design reform. Under such state-backed schemes, the distribution of costs between the market and the state will depend on the balance of supply and demand. Lower demand will decrease spot-market prices, reducing market costs but increasing the cost to CfD-issuing states. If electrification of European energy demand does not keep pace with the electricity supply expansion, tens of billions of euros annually could be channelled through state contracts, generating costs that must ultimately be recovered from consumers. A cost-efficient, managed transition will require European coordination of electricity supply, demand and network investments. Clean electricity supply and demand should be synchronised through a combination of state interventions and market mechanisms. Undersupply of clean power will mean a failure to meet climate targets, but oversupply can be costly too. To manage the costs of renewable de-risking schemes and to accelerate energy-system decarbonisation, flexible electricity systems should be promoted, policies to encourage electrification could be implemented and cost-recovery arising from state-backed renewable support schemes should be fair.
Topic:
Climate Change, Markets, Electricity, Energy, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Unity in power, power in unity: why the EU needs more integrated electricity markets

Author:
Georg Zachmann, Carlos Batlle, Francois Beaude, and Christoph Maurer
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The energy crisis that started in 2022 reminded European governments of the resilience provided by relatively well-integrated European electricity markets, which have been painstakingly built-up over several decades. European Union leaders thus decided to reverse a creeping energy renationalisation and to invest in completing the internal market. However, there are some indications that this momentum is being lost, with different EU capitals taking different lessons from the energy crisis, at a time of unprecedented investment needs in generation and grids across the EU. The multiple benefits of enhanced EU energy-market integration should be emphasised. ‘Techno-economic’ benefits can be secured from optimising the design and operation of several national electricity systems jointly, rather than individually. These benefits will increase massively with higher shares of renewables and include less fossil-fuel burn and less volatile short-term prices, cost savings through harnessing regional renewables advantages, reduced need for expensive back-up capacity and flexibility, and enhanced resilience to shocks. In addition, greater energy-market integration will trigger benefits of a more managerial-governance related nature, though these are harder to quantify. They include benefits in terms of competition, innovation and credibility, which are particularly useful in the electricity sector, which typically faces rather long investment times and high degrees of concentration in purely national markets. Further market integration requires substantial political investment. Governments will need to deal with significant distributional effects within and between countries. Experience has shown that domestic political constraints in this respect are often numerous and difficult to overcome. Therefore, achieving the benefits of integration will require a vision on what degree of integration is feasible and desirable, and how to properly implement and govern it. It will also require an honest acknowledgement of the implications and costs of not pursuing greater integration.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regional Integration, Electricity, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Europe’s under-the-radar industrial policy: intervention in electricity pricing

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The different ways in which European Union member-state governments add levies to the price of electricity creates huge discrepancies in the prices paid by consumers. Europe’s energy transition depends upon increasing electrification of the economy and increasing the share of that electricity produced by renewable sources. Both factors raise the importance of electricity taxes set by governments. The energy crisis drew attention to this: as electricity prices soared, governments responded with billions of euros in subsidies to protect households and companies. While the acute phase of the energy crisis has passed, growing concerns about industrial competitiveness create political pressure for governments to continue with such subsidies or tax exemptions. High profile examples include the French reform of nuclear-power generated electricity pricing, and a political debate in Germany over how aggressively to subsidise the electricity price paid by energy-intensive firms. We frame the debate on intervention in electricity pricing around five distributional dilemmas concerning the recuperation of electricity expenses: 1) whether to raise general or electricity taxes, 2) the split between household and companies, 3) the split between energy-intensive and non-energy intensive companies, 4) cross-border effects, and 5) trade-offs in attracting new clean-technology manufacturing factories. Priorities according to these distributional criteria will differ by country, but these factors should be central to discussions. Governments must recognise that efforts to lower prices artificially for one group of consumers will raise prices for others, including with cross-border implications. The current compromises in the French and German cases do not pose substantial issues to the integrity of the European single market and do not penalise non-energy-intensive domestic consumers excessively.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Electricity, Price, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Phased European Union electricity market reform

Author:
Georg Zachmann and Conall Heussaff
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In an environment of record-breaking electricity prices driven by a gas supply shock and below-average electricity generation, reforming the design of the European electricity market is seen as a means to delink consumer costs from volatility in short-term power markets. Electricity markets should meet three objectives: fairness, optimal investment and optimal operation. The current market design has achieved these objectives to varying degrees. Faced with the unprecedented shock, the electricity system has operated well, but electricity markets have struggled to achieve fair outcomes and investments have not been driven by market-based cashflows. Further complicating market reform, the power system is being changed radically by decarbonisation. The electricity system is becoming more decentralised and digitalised, with an active demand side. These transformations will have consequences for the optimal electricity market design in the later stages of the energy transition. Reform proposals have focused on increasing the share of long-term contracts in the remuneration of generation technologies. Different long-term contracting regimes have structural implications for the functioning of electricity markets, especially in relation to the roles of the state and the market, and the responsibilities of national governments and European Union institutions. A phased approach should be taken to EU electricity market design reform. In the near-term, reform should seek to protect consumers and drive investment. An assessment should also be made of what market design will best meet the fairness, investment and operational objectives in a decarbonised system, and what the conceptual role of electricity markets should be during the transition. This process should start as soon as possible so well thought-through proposals are available when the next European Commission takes office.
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, Electricity, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe