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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Chatham House Author Geoffrey Warner

1. Review article - Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969-1975 (Part two: January 1972-January 1973)

Author:
Geoffrey Warner
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
On 20 January 1972 an alarming message reached Washington from General Creighton Abrams, the US commander in Vietnam. He stated that 'the enemy is preparing and positioning his forces for a major offensive. There is no doubt that this is to be a major campaign . We foresee a hard battle involving sophisticated weaponry and as much ground combat power as the enemy can generate.' He therefore asked for a number of 'standby authorities' for military actions, notably air power. This was just the latest of a series of warnings from Abrams, but it was deemed important enough to be forwarded to the White House, where President Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, raised the matter with his boss later the same day. It was agreed that any decision upon future action should be postponed until after the President's televised speech to the nation on Vietnam on 25 January (vol. VIII, no. 2).
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, and Vietnam

2. Review article—Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part three: January 1973–July 1975

Author:
Geoffrey Warner
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRV's hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a 'decent interval' before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the People's Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting 'post-mortems' from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.
Topic:
Government and History
Political Geography:
United States, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia

3. The Cold War in retrospect

Author:
Geoffrey Warner
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
The Cambridge history of the Cold War is a three-volume work by 75 contributors, mostly from the United States and the United Kingdom, and is intended as 'a substantial work of reference' on the subject. The bulk of the text deals, in frequently overlapping chapters, with the main protagonists of the conflict—viz. the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—and the areas in which they clashed. At the same time, it aims to go 'far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs', although it is not always successful in doing so. In analysing the origins of the Cold War, the contributors pay perhaps too much attention to ideology as opposed to geopolitics, a flaw which is made easier by the absence of sufficient historical background. On the other hand, the duration of the conflict and the failure of various attempts at détente is more successfully explained in terms of the zero-sum game nature of the conflict and its progressive extension from Europe across the rest of the world. When it comes to the end of the Cold War, the overall conclusion is that this came about through both a shift in the international balance of power following the Sino-Soviet split and the political and economic problems of the Soviet bloc. It is generally agreed that Mikhail Gorbachev's willingness to abandon old shibboleths both at home and abroad was a major factor in bringing about the end of the conflict. The three volumes, while not always an easy read, are the outcome of considerable research and expertise in both primary and secondary sources and will repay careful study.
Topic:
Cold War
Political Geography:
United States, China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Soviet Union

4. Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part one: January 1969–January 1972

Author:
Geoffrey Warner
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
Some have suggested that Richard Nixon's narrow victory in the US presidential election of November 1968 was due to his persuading the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) to boycott the Paris peace talks for the settlement of the Vietnam War between the US government, that of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the representatives of the communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. This seems doubtful. The new president had abandoned the hawkish stance he had adopted when vice-president in the Eisenhower administration and was anxious to bring the unpopular war to an end. The question was: how? The president, together with his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted a policy of 'Vietnamization', which involved the progressive scaling down of the US military presence and the handing over of responsibility for waging the war to the GVN. At the same time, the president recognized that too precipitate an American withdrawal and, above all, one which took place under the terms of an agreement which was too favourable to the communists, would have a deleterious effect upon its allies and its own position as a Great Power. In order to bring about a satisfactory agreement with the DRV, the US employed a twin strategy: secret talks between Kissinger and senior DRV representatives in Paris, coupled with veiled threats of an escalation of the war if the communists acted unreasonably and occasional displays of military strength, such as the incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Although it seemed, briefly, that there might be a breakthrough in Kissinger's secret negotiations with the DRV later in 1971, they broke down mainly as a result Abstracts of the communists' insistence that the US in effect dismantle the South Vietnamese government for them. An angry Nixon secretly considered retaliation against the DRV to force it to modify its demands and publicly revealed the existence of the negotiations and much of their content to the American people in a speech on 25 January 1972. At the same time, however, he insisted that Vietnamization would continue.
Political Geography:
United States, Vietnam, and Cambodia

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