Search

Begin New Search Author Gabriel A. Lozada Publication Year within 25 Years

1. The Perils of Antitrust Econometrics: Unrealistic Engel Curves, Inadequate Data, and Aggregation Bias

Author:
Gabriel A. Lozada
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Some economists argue antitrust policy should be based on empirical methods used by the Industrial Organization subdiscipline of economics, but non-economists must understand that those methods contain certain highly restrictive assumptions. Those assumptions involve econometric “identification,” and treating aggregate demand as if it were generated by a representative consumer (Muellbauer’s “generalized linear” preferences). We derive new results illustrating how restrictive the representative consumer assumption is; we explain aggregation bias in Almost Ideal Demand System models; and we show that data limitations make it even harder to justify economists’ restricting aggregate demands as one would the demand of a single individual.
Topic:
Economics, Antitrust Law, Data, and Econometrics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. The Horizontal Merger Efficiency Fallacy

Author:
Mark Glick, Gabriel A. Lozada, Pavitra Govindan, and Darren Bush
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines (the “Merger Guidelines”), including the much improved latest revision in 2023 (the “New Merger Guidelines”), have continued to perpetrate what we call in this paper the horizontal merger efficiency fallacy. The fallacy arises because in the Guidelines the term “efficiencies” has become unmoored from its foundations in economic theory and has been reduced to the business school construct of cost savings. We show that cost savings can only be considered universally socially beneficial by acceptance of what is termed “the Consumer Welfare Standard” (antitrust) or “the surplus theory of welfare” (economics), a theory that has been discredited and abandoned by welfare economists. In economic theory, efficiency means Pareto Efficiency. We explore the various attempts to tether the cost savings definition of efficiency to Pareto Efficiency and explain why these attempts have failed. We conclude that there is no sound way to theoretically reconcile cost savings with the economic meaning of efficiencies. We then move beyond the efficiency fallacy and show how modern welfare economics can be used to integrate Congressional antitrust goals into the New Merger Guidelines. This requires abandoning the unsupported “standard deduction” for efficiencies and replacing it with an evidence-based assessment of how a specific merger under review potentially impacts Congressional antitrust goals. This change renders the present efficiency rebuttal section of the New Merger Guidelines superfluous, and we provide specific reasons why this section as currently drafted is flawed and should be jettisoned.
Topic:
Economics, Government, Markets, Business, and Efficiency
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. The Erroneous Foundations of Law and Economics

Author:
Mark Glick and Gabriel A. Lozada
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The fundamental originating principle of law and economics (L&E) is that legal decisions should be (and are) based on maximizing efficiency. But L&E proponents do not define “efficiency” in the way agreed to by most economists, as Pareto Efficiency. A Pareto optimal condition is obtained when no one can be made better off without making someone worse off. Pareto Improvements are win-win changes where no losers exist. In the judicial system, however, there are always winners and losers, because under Article III § 2 of the Constitution a legal case does not exist unless there is a justiciable “case or controversy” in need of resolution. Unable to use Pareto Efficiency, L&E scholars have been forced to adopt alternative definitions of efficiency. Most L&E scholars claim to define “efficiency” based on the work of Kaldor and Hicks, but (perhaps unwittingly) instead use a definition of “efficiency” derived from the 19th century idea of consumer surplus, which encompasses L&E notions such as “wealth maximization,” and “consumer welfare” in antitrust. Neither of these alternative definitions is viable, however. Outside of L&E, the Kaldor-Hicks approach has long been recognized to be riddled with logical inconsistencies and ethical failures, and the surplus approach is even more deficient. Remarkably, virtually none of the numerous L&E textbooks even hint at such problems. Critically, all definitions of efficiency improvements in economics are biased in favor of wealthy individuals or firms, either because they are dependent on the status quo ante distribution of assets, or because they bestow large advantages on parties with political influence or who can afford to bring lawsuits quickly. Many L&E practitioners treat efficiency improvements instead as being objectively good, an error revealing that L&E is primarily motivated by its neoliberal policy agenda.
Topic:
Economics, Law, Neoliberalism, and Efficiency
Political Geography:
Global Focus