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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Author Fritz W. Scharpf

1. After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
At the end of the postwar period, the politically shaped configurations of normatively integrated European political economies differed greatly among “social-market” and “liberal market economies.” Such differences persist even though the characteristic achievements of social market economies have since eroded under the pressures of global capitalism and of European integration. Focusing on European integration from a social-market perspective, there is no question that it has widened the range of individual options. But it has also reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social inequality and the erosion of public services and transfers. This paper will first summarize those asymmetries of European integration which have done the most to constrain democratic choices and to shift the balance between capital, labor, and the state by establishing an institutional priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratize European politics will not be able to overcome these institutional asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove the institutional constraints. The changes that would be required to restore democratic capacities to shape the political economy could only have a chance if present veto positions were to be fundamentally shaken. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re-foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that would facilitate democratic political action at both the European and national levels.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Politics, Labor Issues, Democracy, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Europe

2. No Exit from the Euro-rescuing Trap?

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper attempts a normative assessment of the input and output-oriented legitimacy of the present euro-rescuing regime on the basis of policy analyses examining the causes of present crises, the available policy options, and the impact of the policies actually chosen. Concluding that the regime lacks input-oriented legitimacy and that its claim to output-oriented legitimacy is ambivalent at best, the paper explores potential – majoritarian or unilateral – exits from the present institutional constellation that is characterized by the synthesis of a non-democratic expertocracy and an extremely asymmetric intergovernmental bargaining system.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Financial Crisis, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
In order to be simultaneously effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. In Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct but coexistent traditions of “republican” and “liberal” political philosophy. When judged by these criteria, the European Union – if considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the “European democratic deficit”) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated by member states – whereas the Union appears as a “government of governments” which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance-legitimacy relationship between the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could and should be able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify them in “communicative discourses” in the national public space. This is not necessarily true of “non-political” policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice. By enforcing its “liberal” program of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the “republican” bases of member-state legitimacy. Where this is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democratization, Government, Politics, and Political Theory
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The Double Asymmetry of European Integration Or: Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, “Integration through Law” does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socioeconomic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in liberal market economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian social market economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive for the compliance of individuals and firms, regardless of the ultimate origin – international, European or national – of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other level, the legitimacy of the European “government of governments” is decisive for the voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance – especially the rules of negative integration defined by politically non-accountable actors – may have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply.
Topic:
Government, International Law, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe

6. No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The unique institutions that make up Germany's "unitary federal state," long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a "joint-decision trap" impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

7. Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The paper begins by examining the functions of input-oriented and output-oriented legitimating arguments in liberal democracies. At the European level, input-oriented arguments remain weak, but legitimacy problems are generally avoided since the policies which can in fact be adopted under prevailing institutional conditions are still based on broad intergovernmental consensus. For a variety of new policy challenges, however, consensus on the choice of European solutions is unlikely to be reached, even though member states are unable to cope with such challenges on their own. Among the examples discussed are the notorious problems of a common foreign, security and defense policy and the spillovers of European economic integration that are challenging national welfare regimes. The resulting problem-solving gaps, which may undermine political legitimacy nationally and in the EU, could not be legitimately overcome by moving from consensual to majoritarian governing modes at the European level. What could help are modes of differentiated integration which allow groups of member states to adopt consensual European solutions applying only to members of the group.
Topic:
International Relations and Civil Society
Political Geography:
Europe

8. The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality. National welfare states are legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration, liberalization, and competition law, whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically impeded by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional structures. In response, the "Open Method of Coordination" is now applied being in the social-policy field. It leaves effective policy choices at the national level, but tries to improve these through promoting common objectives and common indicators and through comparative evaluations of national policy performance. These efforts are useful but cannot overcome the constitutional asymmetry. Hence there is reason to search for solutions which must have the character of European law in order to establish constitutional parity with the rules of European economic integration, but which also must be sufficiently differentiated to accommodate the existing diversity of national welfare regimes. The article discusses two such options, "Closer Cooperation" and a combination of differentiated "framework directives" with the Open Method of Coordination.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

9. What Have We Learned?[1] Problem-Solving Capacity of the Multilevel European Polity.

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This Working Paper is an attempt, occasioned by the evaluation of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, to provide a conceptual framework within which institute research on multi-level European problem solving could be discussed in the context of a more comprehensive overview of the literature. The framework combines an institutional dimension (distinguishing between supranational, joint-decision and intergovernmental modes of EU policy making) and a policy dimension (distinguishing between market-creating, market-enabling, market-correcting and redistributive policies). As institutional modes differ in their capacity for conflict resolution, and as policy types differ in the likelihood of severe policy conflict, greater or lesser problem-solving capacity can be explained by the location of a particular policy area on both of these dimensions.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
05-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The complexity of the multi-level European polity is not adequately represented by the single-level theoretical concepts of competing "intergovernmentalist" and "supranationalist" approaches. By contrast, empirical research focusing on multilevel interactions tends either to emphasize the uniqueness of its objects, or to create novel concepts – which are likely to remain contested even among Europeanists and have the effect of isolating European studies from the political science mainstream in International Relations and Comparative Politics. These difficulties are bound to continue as long as researchers keep proposing holistic concepts that claim to represent the complex reality of the European polity as a whole. It is suggested that the present competition among poorly fitting and contested generalizations could be overcome if European studies made use of a plurality of simpler and complementary concepts, each of which is meant to represent the specific characteristics of certain subsets of multi-level interactions – which could also be applied and tested in other fields of political-science research. The paper goes on to describe four distinct modes of multi-level interaction in the European polity – "mutual adjustment", "intergovernmental negotiations", "joint-decision making", and "hierarchical direction" – and to discuss their characteristics by reference to the criteria of problem-solving capacity and institutional legitimacy.
Topic:
International Relations, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe