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Begin New Search Publishing Institution International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS Author Frank Jüris

1. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia

Author:
Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States

2. The Talsinki Tunnel: Channelling Chinese Interests into the Baltic Sea

Author:
Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China’s assertive foreign policy is best known for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In Northern Europe, China is interested in developing the Polar Silk Road which, using the Northeast Passage route, could significantly cut down the transit time between Asia and Europe and provide alternative route to the target European market. The Tallinn–Helsinki connection should be seen as part of this route, which helps explain why the Chinese investor TouchStone Capital and state-owned construction companies have shown interest in building an undersea rail tunnel between Helsinki and Tallinn (the “Talsinki tunnel”). This paper analyses Chinese strategic interests through the BRI initiative in general and the Polar Silk Road in particular. With the focus on the motives of the host countries it tries to find out, how well they resonate with Chinese interests in the region. This analysis looks at the preparations made for the implementation of the project and describes the Chinese state actors involved in it. The final, largest section analyses the security risks involved in the implementation of the tunnel project and highlights the potential security risks that need to be taken into consideration by the host countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Resilience
Political Geography:
China and Asia

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