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Begin New Search Topic Government Author Francis E. Warnock

1. Corporate Governance and the Shareholder Base

Author:
Francis E. Warnock and Karl V. Lins
Publication Date:
08-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
This paper uses a sample of 4,410 firms from 29 countries to investigate the relation between corporate governance and the shareholder base. In contrast to previous work, our results strongly support the notion that poor corporate governance, at both the firm and country level, negatively impacts the willingness of foreign investors to hold a firm's equity. Specifically, we find that firms whose managers have sufficiently high control rights that they may reasonably be expected to expropriate minority equity investors attract significantly less U.S. investment, especially in countries with poor external governance. Our findings suggest that the prices U.S. investors are asked to pay for firms with poor governance are not low enough to fully compensate them for expected expropriation or increased estimation risk associated with expected poor disclosure by these firms. Because prior research shows that a smaller shareholder base is associated with a lower firm value, our results are consistent with the notion that the shareholder base represents an important channel through which poor expected corporate governance contributes to a reduction in firm value.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States

2. Look at Me Now: The Role of Cross-Listing in Attracting U.S. Investors

Author:
Francis E. Warnock, John Ammer, Sara B. Holland, and David C. Smith
Publication Date:
08-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
We use a comprehensive 1997 survey to examine U.S. investors' preferences for foreign equities. We document a variety of firm characteristics that can influence U.S. investment, but the most important determinant is whether the stock is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. Our selection bias-corrected estimates imply that firms that cross-list can increase their U.S. holdings by 8 to 11 percent of their market capitalization, roughly doubling the amount held without cross-listing. All else equal, we find that firms experience smaller increases in U.S. shareholdings upon cross-listing if they are Canadian, from English speaking countries, are members of the MSCI World index, or had higher quality accounting standards prior to crosslisting. We argue that these findings suggest that improvements in information production explain U.S. investors' attraction to foreign stocks that cross-list in the United States.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States and Canada