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1. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

2. Protests in Iran in comparative perspective: A revolutionary state in trouble

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Successive protests in 2009, 2019 and 2022 have poignantly laid bare the much reduced social and political legitimacy of Iran’s ruling elites. Reform-from-within is no longer viewed as credible. Even former pro-reform leaders like Mousavi have abandoned hope and call for regime change. While further protests are inevitable, it is nevertheless unlikely that they will produce a revolution that overthrows the regime in the short-term, as long as their national organisation and leadership remain weak, Iran’s ruling elites cohesive, security forces loyal, and the administration continues to function. The country has witnessed hundreds of protests every year for the past few years, in addition to those of 2009, 2019 and 2022, but calls for fundamental change continue to go unheeded. The hope of the ruling elite is that the mix of repression and Iran’s dire economic situation will prevent protests from recurring. At best, quasi-reforms will provide some band-aids. In both scenarios, the Islamic Republic of Iran is no more in the sense that it lacks legitimacy among large segments of the population. It has also shed the elements of republican governance it used to have. And yet it lives on because it remains a capable state with a fairly cohesive ruling elite and ample coercive power. Iran is on course to become a classic one-party authoritarian regime, which may shed some of its religious orientations once its Supreme Leader leaves office for reasons of age. It remains to be seen how sustainable this will be given the crescendo of protests.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Domestic Politics, Protests, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

3. Phoenix or Icarus? European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
With all eyes on the next Russian move in Ukraine, the notion of European strategic autonomy is experiencing a revival. At first glance, this seems overdue given that talks between Washington and Moscow bypass Brussels entirely. But beyond a limited use for the concept to help mitigate vulnerabilities resulting from dependencies and credibly malign actors that can exploit them, the notion remains surplus to requirements. Broad use of the term ‘EU strategic autonomy’, as is in vogue, risks giving populism and nationalism an unnecessary impulse. It also risks unmooring the EU from its collaborative and compromise-oriented essence because it depicts the world outside the EU as a swamp where danger lurks behind every tree. If EU Member States want a more assertive and capable set of institutions that act on their behalf, they should just get on with their unfinished business – the Single European Market, industrial/digital policy, fiscal transfers and defence/security policy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Turkish interventions in its near abroad: The case of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The primary objective of Turkey’s recent interventions in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is to cut the Gordian knot of its own Kurdish question by engaging the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates militarily until they no longer control any territory. To this end, it is essential that Ankara maintains Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – and especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) – as a junior and compliant partner. A secondary Turkish objective is to balance Iran’s influence in Iraq’s disputed territories, mainly by acting as protector of Turkmen and Sunni groups. In the background, the Turkish Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) desire to maintain regime stability at home plays an important role since its alliance with the ultranationalist-conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and some of its domestic legitimacy depends on the success of Turkish interventions into the KRI. Such interventions have historical precedent, but their scope and scale have increased significantly since 2018, with the effect that Ankara has been able to force the PKK into a defensive position. This has been achieved at the cost of the KDP’s popular legitimacy, an increase in PKK popularity and significant collateral damage among ordinary Iraqi (Kurdish) citizens. Further intensification of Turkish interventions into Sinjar, the Nineveh Plains or Sulaymaniyah will lead to greater tensions with both Baghdad and Iran. An extension of UNAMI’s security sector reform work to include border control can help prevent further conflict escalation by inserting a more neutral actor into this volatile situation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)