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1. Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Rosatom, its entities, and its senior personnel should be subjected to far greater sanctions by the United States and its allies. Sanction carveouts or waivers can be granted for nuclear reactor safety considerations, operating nuclear reactors, and for other Rosatom customers as they wind down existing contracts. However, the status quo is not sustainable. It leaves the United States and its allies vulnerable to political and economic pressure by Rosatom and its owner Russia, with the constant threat that this Putin-controlled entity could cut off energy supplies. This already happened to Germany in September 2022 when Gazprom, another Putin-controlled entity, cut off natural gas supplies to Germany as a result of a clash over Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Only a mild winter staved off serious and needless suffering by the German people. Rosatom deserves sanctions today. It is not just a benign commercial nuclear energy supplier. Rosatom has actively participated in the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), a seizure causing an increased risk of a major nuclear accident. Rosatom officials are not authorized to operate these reactors. IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi has called this situation “not sustainable” and “risks nuclear safety and security.” Rosatom is also complicit in the human rights violations of Ukrainian plant personnel, violations that include torture. Rosatom also actively contributes importantly to the production of Russian weapon systems used against Ukraine. A case in point is the participation of one of its subsidiaries in the production of the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone that Russia has used to destroy much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and terrorize its civilian population.
Topic:
Sanctions, Nuclear Energy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

2. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

3. Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the December 22, 2010 ISIS report on Stuxnet, 1 ISIS found that this malware contained important evidence indicating that its target was the IR-1 centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. ISIS focused on the attack sequences generated by a Siemens S7-315 programmable logic controller (PLC) connected to frequency converters of a particular type. The ISIS analysis centered on the rotational frequencies listed in these detailed attack sequences. These frequencies matched, in two cases identically, key frequencies characteristic of the IR-1 centrifuge at the FEP. A further analysis of another attack sequence has revealed that this code contains a description of what appears to be an exact copy of the IR-1 cascade at the FEP. The attack is titled “Sequence C” by Symantec, the computer security company that has conducted the most thorough and reliable open analysis of the malware’s code, or “417 code” after the advanced Siemens S7-417 programmable logic controller that Stuxnet targets. 2 However, the 417 code is not activated and thus unable to launch an attack. 3 Moreover, key data is missing from the code available to Symantec that would define exactly what is affected or sabotaged. 4 Symantec has assessed that the 417 code is likely unfinished, perhaps a work in progress. Additional analysis also lends more support to the conclusion that the Stuxnet malware is aimed principally at destroying centrifuges, not manipulating parameters of the centrifuge cascades so as to lower the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) on a sustained basis. To date, Stuxnet is known to have had at least one successful attack. It is increasingly accepted that, in late 2009 or early 2010, Stuxnet destroyed about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges out of about 9,000 deployed at the site. The effect of this attack was significant. It rattled the Iranians, who were unlikely to know what caused the breakage, delayed the expected expansion of the plant, and further consumed a limited supply of centrifuges to replace those destroyed. Nonetheless, Iran took steps in the aftermath of the attack that likely reduced further damage by Stuxnet, principally shutting down many centrifuge cascades for months. The shutdown lasted long enough for the malware to be discovered publicly, by which time Iran could have found Stuxnet on the Natanz control systems.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Nuclear Energy, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

4. Fukushima Crisis: Unmonitored Releases Preliminary Assessment of Accident Sequences and Potential Atmospheric Radiation Releases

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The following chronology details events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor station in Japan from March 11-25, 2011. It includes notable radiation spikes and corresponding wind patterns, as well as satellite imagery of the plant. All reported times correspond with local time in Japan.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Fukushima Disaster, Nuclear Energy, and Radiation
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

5. IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Shutdown of Enrichment at Natanz Result of Stuxnet Virus?; Downgrade in Role of Fordow Enrichment Site; LEU Production May Have Decreased

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on November 23, 2010 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran’s compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803. The following analysis highlights the IAEA’s key findings, including 1) a mysterious halt to enrichment at Natanz resulted in centrifuges not enriching for up to one week during November 2010, which ISIS speculates could have been the result of the Stuxnet virus; 2) fewer P1 centrifuges are planned for the Fordow enrichment site; and 3) the average monthly rate of low enriched uranium production increased but many additional centrifuges enriching by end of reporting period; and 4) monthly production rates of 20 percent enriched LEU remain steady.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant?

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In late 2009 or early 2010, Iran decommissioned and replaced about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, implying that these centrifuges broke. Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges often break, yet this level of breakage exceeded expectations and occurred during an extended period of relatively poor centrifuge performance. Although mechanical failures or operational problems have often been discussed as causing problems in the IR-1 centrifuges,1 the crashing of such a large number of centrifuges over a relatively short period of time could have resulted from an infection of the Stuxnet malware.2 This malicious code seeks to take over an industrial control system in order to destroy equipment while hiding its presence.3 Given Stuxnet’s much greater prevalence in Iran compared to other countries, it is likely that this malware was aimed at Iran. Stuxnet covertly changes the frequencies of certain types of frequency converters, which control the speed of motors. The frequencies listed in Stuxnet’s attack sequences, including the nominal frequency of a motor, imply that a target is the IR-1 centrifuge.4 However, Stuxnet’s exact purpose or its overall effect on the FEP remains hard to assess. If Stuxnet’s goal was the destruction of all the centrifuges in the FEP, Stuxnet failed. But if its goal was to destroy a more limited number of centrifuges and set back Iran’s progress in operating FEP while making detection of the malware difficult, it may have succeeded, at least for a while.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Nuclear Energy, Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and Centrifuges
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. North Korea’s Plutonium Production Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
On December 27, Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper quoted U.S. and North Korean officials saying that North Korea had declared a plutonium stockpile of about 30 kilograms. The report was subsequently picked up by several wires, including AFP and UPI. Based on discussions with a knowledgeable official, this roughly 30 kilograms of plutonium apparently refers to a stock of plutonium that North Korea separated from irradiated fuel produced in the five megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon. The separation of the plutonium occurred at the Radiochemical Laboroatory at Yongbyon. If this quantity refers to separated plutonium (and not the total quantity of plutonium produced in the spent fuel of several reactor cores), it does fall inside the lower bound of the range of the amount of separated plutonium that ISIS has assessed North Korea could now possess.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Plutonium, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

8. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region.2 Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East