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Begin New Search Political Geography Middle East Author David Albright

11. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators. It is in that light that we have chosen to address the dangerous claim published on September 13, 2012 by Daniel Joyner, a law professor at the University of Alabama, that the IAEA has exceeded its legal mandate in applying safeguards in Iran in accordance with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the importance of the IAEA's activities regarding Iran, the persistent efforts by Iran to call into question the legitimacy of those IAEA activities, and our concern to ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to the agency's mandates, we are writing to discuss those mandates and explain why Joyner is incorrect.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

12. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

13. Performance of the IR-1 Centrifuge at Natanz

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
During the past year, the performance of the IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has faltered. Although the average monthly production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has increased to about 150 kg/month, the number of centrifuges needed to produce this LEU has increased disproportionately compared to the previous year. During the last year, Iran has needed 5,860 IR-1 centrifuges to produce this amount of LEU. In the previous year, it would have needed only about 4,820 IR-1 centrifuges to make this quantity of LEU.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Uranium, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

14. Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the December 22, 2010 ISIS report on Stuxnet, 1 ISIS found that this malware contained important evidence indicating that its target was the IR-1 centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. ISIS focused on the attack sequences generated by a Siemens S7-315 programmable logic controller (PLC) connected to frequency converters of a particular type. The ISIS analysis centered on the rotational frequencies listed in these detailed attack sequences. These frequencies matched, in two cases identically, key frequencies characteristic of the IR-1 centrifuge at the FEP. A further analysis of another attack sequence has revealed that this code contains a description of what appears to be an exact copy of the IR-1 cascade at the FEP. The attack is titled “Sequence C” by Symantec, the computer security company that has conducted the most thorough and reliable open analysis of the malware’s code, or “417 code” after the advanced Siemens S7-417 programmable logic controller that Stuxnet targets. 2 However, the 417 code is not activated and thus unable to launch an attack. 3 Moreover, key data is missing from the code available to Symantec that would define exactly what is affected or sabotaged. 4 Symantec has assessed that the 417 code is likely unfinished, perhaps a work in progress. Additional analysis also lends more support to the conclusion that the Stuxnet malware is aimed principally at destroying centrifuges, not manipulating parameters of the centrifuge cascades so as to lower the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) on a sustained basis. To date, Stuxnet is known to have had at least one successful attack. It is increasingly accepted that, in late 2009 or early 2010, Stuxnet destroyed about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges out of about 9,000 deployed at the site. The effect of this attack was significant. It rattled the Iranians, who were unlikely to know what caused the breakage, delayed the expected expansion of the plant, and further consumed a limited supply of centrifuges to replace those destroyed. Nonetheless, Iran took steps in the aftermath of the attack that likely reduced further damage by Stuxnet, principally shutting down many centrifuge cascades for months. The shutdown lasted long enough for the malware to be discovered publicly, by which time Iran could have found Stuxnet on the Natanz control systems.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Nuclear Energy, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

15. IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Shutdown of Enrichment at Natanz Result of Stuxnet Virus?; Downgrade in Role of Fordow Enrichment Site; LEU Production May Have Decreased

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on November 23, 2010 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran’s compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803. The following analysis highlights the IAEA’s key findings, including 1) a mysterious halt to enrichment at Natanz resulted in centrifuges not enriching for up to one week during November 2010, which ISIS speculates could have been the result of the Stuxnet virus; 2) fewer P1 centrifuges are planned for the Fordow enrichment site; and 3) the average monthly rate of low enriched uranium production increased but many additional centrifuges enriching by end of reporting period; and 4) monthly production rates of 20 percent enriched LEU remain steady.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

16. Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant?

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In late 2009 or early 2010, Iran decommissioned and replaced about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, implying that these centrifuges broke. Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges often break, yet this level of breakage exceeded expectations and occurred during an extended period of relatively poor centrifuge performance. Although mechanical failures or operational problems have often been discussed as causing problems in the IR-1 centrifuges,1 the crashing of such a large number of centrifuges over a relatively short period of time could have resulted from an infection of the Stuxnet malware.2 This malicious code seeks to take over an industrial control system in order to destroy equipment while hiding its presence.3 Given Stuxnet’s much greater prevalence in Iran compared to other countries, it is likely that this malware was aimed at Iran. Stuxnet covertly changes the frequencies of certain types of frequency converters, which control the speed of motors. The frequencies listed in Stuxnet’s attack sequences, including the nominal frequency of a motor, imply that a target is the IR-1 centrifuge.4 However, Stuxnet’s exact purpose or its overall effect on the FEP remains hard to assess. If Stuxnet’s goal was the destruction of all the centrifuges in the FEP, Stuxnet failed. But if its goal was to destroy a more limited number of centrifuges and set back Iran’s progress in operating FEP while making detection of the malware difficult, it may have succeeded, at least for a while.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Nuclear Energy, Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and Centrifuges
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

17. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region. Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

18. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region.2 Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East

19. Middle East Weapons Proliferation: Lessons from Iraq and Beyond

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt and David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The culmination of Operation Iraqi Freedom has given rise to much debate concerning the exact nature of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Similarly, ongoing negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear activities have also been dogged by imprecise intelligence and unclear strategies. Both of these cases have led many to realize that noncompliance with weapons inspections does not automatically indicate the existence of hidden weapons programs. Although the Senate Intelligence Committee has yet to issue its report on Iraqi WMD, one could reasonably argue that the situation in Iraq during the 1990s served as an example of how inspections can provide a powerful deterrent against covert WMD activity. At present, it is too early to establish with any certainty the exact nature of Iraqi WMD prior to the invasion. Just as some prewar analyses were mistaken when they claimed to know precisely where Iraq's weapons stockpiles were, it would now be erroneous to declare that the country possessed no WMD before the war or that such weapons are not present there today. One must remain open to various possibilities until history comes down conclusively on either side.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Arab Countries

20. Special Policy Forum Report: Iran's Nuclear Program -- Countdown?

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt and David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On June 4, 2003, David Albright and Michael Eisenstadt addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. Mr. Albright is president of the Institute for Science and International Security and has also served as an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspector in Iraq. Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute specializing in military and security affairs. His publications include Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (The Washington Institute, 1996) and "Living with a Nuclear Iran?" (Survival, Autumn 1999).
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Iraq, Washington, Middle East, and Arabia