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Begin New Search Topic Monetary Policy Author Daniel Gros

1. Global Monetary Policy Divergence and the Reemergence of Global Imbalances

Author:
Daniel Gros
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Developed economies are paying remarkably little attention to coordinating their monetary policies. This is an unavoidable consequence of the independence of central banks, which faithfully follow their purely domestic mandates except in times of crisis. As a result, global monetary policies have reached unprecedented levels of divergence. This divergence is set to widen—primarily due to differences in the relative strength of labor markets—while global current account imbalances return. Meanwhile, exchange rates have not reacted as economists expected; the dollar has weakened even as policy rates have increased. Economic tensions will likely become more disruptive the longer global imbalances go uncorrected. Likewise, the global economy will become more vulnerable to shocks. Yet by focusing on bilateral trade imbalances, the United States has mistakenly singled out China when the global imbalances between the United States and the eurozone is the more critical issue. The growing global imbalances are reflected more in the eurozone current account surplus and U.S. fiscal policy than in China’s shrinking surplus.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy, and Economic Inequality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. The EMS Crisis of the 1990s: Parallels with the present crisis?

Author:
Daniel Gros
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The EMS crisis of the 1990 s illustrated the importance of a lack of confidence in price or exchange rate stability, whereas the present crisis illustrates the importance of a lack of confidence in fiscal sustainability. Theoretically the difference between the two should be minor since, in terms of the real return to an investor, the loss of purchasing power can be the same when inflation is unexpectedly high, or when the nominal value of government debt is cut in a formal default. Experience has shown, however, that expropriation via a formal default is much more disruptive than via inflation.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

3. The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and Germany: When is a current account surplus an 'imbalance'?

Author:
Daniel Gros and Matthias Busse
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) was designed to prevent the emergence of imbalances like the large and persistent current account deficits that occurred in Spain and Ireland. But within this mechanism, a current account surplus is also viewed as a source of concern. Indeed, last year's Alert Mechanism Report (AMR), issued by the European Commission signalled an excessive current account surplus for the Netherlands and Luxembourg, while Germany just barely scraped by with a 5.9% surplus, marginally evading the 6% threshold (over a 3-year average). With the most recent report, however, Germany's status has changed. Along with the Netherlands and Luxembourg, it too has now been singled out as a euro-area country with a surplus above the upper threshold.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

4. Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination instead of separation

Author:
Daniel Gros and Thorsten Beck
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The June 2012 European Council decided that the legal basis for the 'Single Supervisory Mechanism' should be Article 127(6) of the Treaty, and that the SSM should 'involve' the ECB. This implies only that supervision should be concentrated within the ECB. In the policy discussion it is, however, generally taken for granted that there should be 'Chinese walls' between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal is explicit on this account.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, and Governance
Political Geography:
China and Europe

5. Liquidity in times of crisis: Even the ESM needs it

Author:
Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper argues that the new permanent European rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), should be provided with a liquidity backstop by having it registered as a bank – and be treated as such by the European Central Bank. If the crisis were to become acute again, the ESM would stand ready to intervene in secondary markets, potentially with almost unlimited amounts of funding. Access to central bank financing will be crucial in a future crisis, because in such a crisis risk aversion is likely to be extreme, and even the ESM might not be able to raise at very short notice the huge sums that might be required to prevent a breakdown of the financial system. Hundreds of billions of euro might be needed just to top up the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal – and Spain and Italy may require more than a thousand billion euro. Sums of this order of magnitude cannot be raised quickly by a new institution. Simply increasing the headline size of the ESM might thus be of little use.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland

6. Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area: Symptom or cause of the crisis?

Author:
Daniel Gros
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
Lax financial conditions can foster credit booms. The global credit boom of the last decade led to large capital flows across the world, including large movements of resources from the Northern countries of the euro area towards the Southern part. Since the start of the crisis and more markedly after 2009, these flows have suddenly stopped, creating severe adjustment pressures. This paper argues that, at this point, the common monetary policy can only try to mitigate the unavoidable adjustment by maintaining overall financial stability. The challenge is to strike a delicate balance between providing liquidity for solvent institutions while keeping the overall pressure on for a rapid correction of the imbalances.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

7. 'Grexit': Who would pay for it?

Author:
Daniel Gros, Cinzia Alcidi, and Alessandro Giovannini
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
What would be the cost if Greece were to exit from the eurozone? This much-debated question cannot be answered with a single number. The consequences of Greece's exit would depend decisively on the exact circumstances of events in the country itself as well as the general state of financial markets in the eurozone.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Regional Cooperation, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

8. A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund

Author:
Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
The eurozone is caught in a 'diabolical loop' in which weak domestic banking systems damage sovereign fiscal positions and conversely, in which risky sovereign positions disproportionately threaten domestic banking stability. A European-level banking system could go a long way towards breaking this unfortunate loop and stabilising the eurozone. This would require a European safety net for cross-border banks.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB

Author:
Daniel Gros, Cinzia Alcidi, and Alessandro Giovannini
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first 'stage' of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Debt reduction without default?

Author:
Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper proposes a two-step, market-based approach to debt reduction: · Step 1.The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) would offer holders of debt of the countries with an EFSF programme (probably Greece, Ireland and Portugal = GIP) an exchange into EFSF paper at the market price prior to their entry into an EFSF-funded programme. The offer would be valid for 90 days. Banks would be forced in the context of the ongoing stress tests to write down even their banking book and thus would have an incentive to accept the offer. · Step 2. Once the EFSF had acquired most of the GIP debt, it would assess debt sustainability country by country. a) If the market price discount at which it acquired the bonds is enough to ensure sustainability, the EFSF will write down the nominal value of its claims to this amount, provided the country agrees to additional adjustment efforts (and, in some cases, asset sales). b) If under a central scenario this discount is not enough to ensure sustainability, the EFSF might agree on a lower interest rate, but with GDP warrants to participate in the upside.
Topic:
Debt, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe