1. Counter-Terrorism: A Game Theoretic Analysis
- Author:
- Daniel G. Arce M. and Todd Sandler
- Publication Date:
- 02-2004
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International Studies, University of Southern California
- Abstract:
- This paper establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policy or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counterterrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an equilibrium with socially inferior payoffs when compared with proactive responses. Proactive policies tend to provide purely public benefits to all potential targets and are usually undersupplied, whereas defensive policies tend to yield a strong share of provider-specific benefits and are often oversupplied. When terrorists direct a disproportionate number of attacks at one government, its reliance on defensive measures can disappear. Ironically, terrorists' can assist governments in addressing coordination dilemmas associated with some antiterrorist policies by targeting some countries more often than others.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Government, and Terrorism