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Begin New Search Political Geography Middle East Author Daniel C. Kurtzer

1. United States Diplomacy and the 1973 War

Author:
Daniel C. Kurtzer
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ushered in a period of active American diplomacy that contributed to two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements, one Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, and, several years later, the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace. The successes of the American efforts masked a number of significant weaknesses in concept, strategy, and tactics that would plague U.S. diplomacy in the decades that followed. The story of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be told through “before and after” narratives of critical inflection points. The period after World War I—which witnessed the adoption of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine—was unlike anything that preceded the Great War. The period after the 1948 war—Israel’s war of independence and Palestine’s nakba—upturned history and took the central characters of that era in an entirely different direction from what preceded. The same can be said for the June 1967 war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Henry Kissinger, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1973 War, and 1967 War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arab Countries, Egypt, and United States of America

2. Annexation Makes No Policy Sense

Author:
Daniel C. Kurtzer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The fors and againsts of the West Bank’s annexation.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Borders, Annexation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and West Bank

3. A Third Lebanon War: CPA Contingency Planning

Author:
Daniel C. Kurtzer
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Lebanon has been a flashpoint for Arab-Israeli violence and military confrontations since the mid1970s. Its political system is weak and outside parties continue to vie for political advantage as part of a larger regional conflict. In particular, Syria and Iran provide support for the militant Islamist group Hezbollah as a strategic asset to pressure Israel. Hezbollah now controls most of southern Lebanon, while its political wing has developed a strong presence in the Lebanese parliament. In July and August 2006, Israel and Hezbollah fought what became known as the “Second Lebanon War,” which killed and displaced many thousand s of people and destroyed much of Lebanon's infrastructure. Since then Hezbollah has steadily rearmed in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which requires, inter alia, “the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state” and “no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its government.” Hezbollah's arsenal is more potent in quantity and quality today than it was in 2006. Although the border area between Israel and Lebanon is quieter than at any time in the previous decade, speculation that a third Lebanon war will occur in the next twelve to eighteen months has been steadily rising. Israel could decide the security threat posed by Hezbollah has reached intolerable levels and take preemptive military action. Hezbollah, while outwardly showing no interest in confronting Israel at this time, may for various reasons choose or be pressured by Iran to flex its new military capabilities. As happened in 2006, even small-scale military engagements with limited objectives can escalate into a major conflict. Whatever the precipitating reasons, a new conflict over Lebanon would have significant implications for U.S. policy and interests in the region.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Arabia, United Nations, Lebanon, and Syria

4. Shortsighted Statecraft

Author:
Daniel C. Kurtzer
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Stopping three decades of unnecessary bungling.There is a feature of my seminars on U.S. Middle East policy at Princeton that I call "déjà vu all over again" -- with apologies to Yogi Berra. I ask students to assess the bungled efforts and missed opportunities of generations of U.S. diplomats and seek in them lessons for the future. They examine the hubris that drove the U.S. government to engineer the 1953 overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq's democratically elected government in Iran. This traumatic episode was conveniently forgotten by 1979, when National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski encouraged Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to use force against the opposition, ignoring the warnings of U.S. diplomats on the ground in Iran that the shah's reign was doomed. Similarly, the United States forgot the lesson of the limited and United Nations-approved 1991 war in response to Iraq's aggression in Kuwait when it launched an ideologically inspired invasion of Iraq in 2003. Likewise, in 2006, Washington seemed to have forgotten the fiasco that followed Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Rather than learn from the past, Washington backed Israel's ill-advised attempt to deliver a knockout blow against another Lebanese foe, this time Hezbollah. My students and I conclude -- only half-jokingly -- that U.S. policymakers ought to take the class before taking office.
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, and Kuwait