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1. Sovereign Haircuts: 200 Years of Creditor Losses

Author:
Clemens M. Graf von Luckner, Josefin Meyer, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We study sovereign external debt crises over the past 200 years, with a focus on creditor losses, or "haircuts". Our sample covers 327 sovereign debt restructurings with external private creditors over 205 default spells since 1815. Creditor losses vary widely (from none to 100%), but the statistical distribution has remained remarkably stable over two centuries, with an average haircut of around 45 percent. The data also reveal that “serial restructurings”, meaning two or more debt exchanges in the same default spell, are on the rise. To account for this trend toward serial renegotiation, we introduce the “Bulow-Rogoff haircut” – a cumulative measure that captures the combined creditor loss across all restructurings during a single debt crisis. Using this measure, we show that longer debt crises deliver larger haircuts and that interim restructurings provide limited debt relief. We further examine past predictors of the size of haircuts and identify “rules of thumb” applicable to future defaults. Poorer countries, first-time debt issuers, and those that borrowed heavily from external creditors all record significantly higher haircuts in case of a default. Geopolitical shocks – such as wars, revolutions, or the break-up of empires – deliver the deepest haircuts. Sovereign debt investment disasters are often linked to (geo-)political disasters.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, Geopolitics, Credit, Sovereign Debt, Emerging Economies, Debt Restructuring, and Sovereign Default
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Who Lends to Africa and How? Introducing the Africa Debt Database

Author:
David Mihalyi and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Africa’s sovereign debt markets are not well understood, partly due to a lack of data. This paper introduces the Africa Debt Database (ADD), the most granular and comprehensive dataset on external borrowing by African governments thus far. Our project moves beyond existing aggregate datasets and instead releases information on individual loans and bonds, in particular on the financial terms of each instrument. Taken together, we cover nearly 7000 loans and bonds between 2000 and 2020, with a total volume of 644 billion USD. Using this data, we study Africa’s record lending boom of the 2010s in detail. The debt boom was mainly driven by large sovereign bond issuances in London and New York, as well as growing lending by Chinese state-owned banks. The micro data also reveal a large variation in lending terms across countries, time, and creditors. Sovereign external bonds have interest rates of 6 percent, on average, Chinese banks charge 2-4 percent, and multilateral organizations just 1 percent. Strikingly, many governments in Africa simultaneously borrow large amounts from both private and official creditors, at vastly different rates. The large differences in debt servicing costs are indicative of a cross-creditor subsidy, as cheap concessional loans can be used to pay the high interest to private or Chinese creditors.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Aid, Credit, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

3. Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs

Author:
Chuck Fang, Julian Schumacher, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Sovereign debt crises are difficult to solve. This paper studies the “holdout problem”, meaning the risk that creditors refuse to participate in a debt restructuring. We document a large variation in holdout rates, based on a comprehensive new dataset of 23 bond restructurings with external creditors since 1994. We then study the determinants of holdouts and find that the size of creditor losses (haircuts) is among the best predictors at the bond level. In a restructuring, bonds with higher haircuts see higher holdout rates, and the same is true for small bonds and those issued under foreign law. Collective action clauses (CACs) are effective in reducing holdout risks. However, classic CACs, with bond-by-bond voting, are not sufficient to assure high participation rates. Only the strongest form of CACs, with single-limb aggregate voting, minimizes the holdout problem according to our simulations. The results help to inform theory as well as current policy initiatives on reforming sovereign bond markets.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, Law, and Credit
Political Geography:
Global Focus