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Begin New Search Topic Government Author Charles W. Parker III

1. The U.S. National Security Strategy and the Global War on Terror “Force Multiplier”

Author:
Charles W. Parker III
Publication Date:
04-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Abstract:
In September 2002, President George W. Bush published a new National Security Strategy (NSS) in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States homeland. The publication of the new NSS represented a codification of a series of policy ideas that had been brewing since the end of the first Bush Administration and throughout the Clinton Administration, which were sharpened as a result of the newly perceived threats to the United States' security posture. Some prominent academics have argued that the NSS and Bush's actions represent a “neoimperialist” or “unilateralist” approach to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, and are a radical and fundamental shift in the trajectory of U.S. power projection and assertiveness. They also lament a rift in relations with European allies in part due to this new policy trajectory, to the point of declaring that the Europe and the United States will be future rivals on the world stage.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Government
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

2. International Investor Influence in the 1994-1995 Mexican Peso Crisis

Author:
Charles W. Parker III
Publication Date:
04-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Abstract:
This essay provides a detailed overview, at a market- and firm- level, of the involvement and influence international portfolio investors had in the development and outcomes of the Mexico Peso Crisis of 1994-1995. It address two problems with the literature that is critical of the role of international investors during the crisis; the lack of specific data of market activity by firms that were engaged in Mexico during the volatile period before and after the December 1994 devaluation, and details on private creditor interactions with government officials in key episodes of the crisis. Through a review of the literature, industry data, and confidential interviews with key governmental and private actors, this essay concludes that there was sizable concentration of international investment firms engaged in Mexico, but claims they instigated or exacerbated the crisis are overblown; global funds rather than emerging market funds were a more likely culprit in Mexican market volatility and only after the devaluation; the role of investment banks as participants has been underestimated and is important in understanding collective action problems in finding a solution to the crisis; and a lack of information and mutual confidence, as well as policy overdependence on foreign capital flows, rather than purported “structural power,” were far more important factors in determining the onset and outcomes of the crisis.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
Central America and Mexico