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Begin New Search Publishing Institution The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, Author Carl Dahlström

1. Marketization and the Quality of Residential Elderly Care in Sweden

Author:
Rasmus Broms, Carl Dahlström, and Marina Nistotskaya
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
Against a backdrop of increased levels of marketization of welfare services in OECD countries, this article aims to shed light on the separate effects of private ownership and competition on service quality. Using residential elderly care in Sweden as our case, we leverage unique panel data of ownership and competition against a set of indicators, pertaining to the structure, process and outcome dimensions of care quality. The main finding of our analyses is that competition does surprisingly little for quality: private entrepreneurs perform neither better nor worse under stiff competition and the quality of care is approximately the same in those nursing homes that are exposed to competition from private actors as in those that are not.
Topic:
International Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. The Abandoned Trustees. Explaining Corruption in Local Government

Author:
Salvador Parrado, Victor Lapuente, and Carl Dahlström
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Abstract:
This paper engages in the debate about how different ways of organizing relations between politicians and bureaucrats affect corruption. Research has established robust correlations between the political autonomy of bureaucracy and low corruption, on both national and regional levels, but there are few studies that explore the causal mechanisms linking these two phenomena. We do so by comparing public procurement processes in two similar Spanish cities, interviewing all important actors. We show that relatively independent bureaucrats—so-called trustees—can act as checks to prevent political moral hazard. Yet, in order for this to occur, other institutions must support the trustee, such as a merit-based human resources policy, rules, and standard operating procedures, transparency and independent watchdogs. There is thus no silver bullet to defend us against corruption, but having these mechanisms in place makes it much more costly for politicians to oppor- tunistically bend public procurement processes to favour bribe-paying contractors.
Topic:
Corruption and Political Power Sharing
Political Geography:
Spain