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21. Masque of Democracy: Iraqi Election System Still Disfavors Sunni Arabs, Favors Kurds

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
12-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
In its National Strategy for Victory in Iraq the Bush administration recognizes that the key to defusing the insurgency is drawing the Sunni Arab community into the political process. And it correctly sees that this requires "inclusive institutions that offer power-sharing mechanisms and minority protections." As the strategy notes: such institutions would "demonstrate to disaffected Sunnis that they have influence and the ability to protect their interests in a democratic Iraq." Unfortunately, the administration finds it difficult to apply this precept where it would matter most: in the election process.
Topic:
Democratization, Ethnic Conflict, and Government
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, and Kurdistan

22. Arms Control in an Age of Strategic and Military Revolution

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
11-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
We have come a long way since autumn 1989 and the few optimistic years that followed. During that dawn of the post-Cold War era, security policy discourse focused briefly on notions of common security and a peace dividend. Since then, these ideas have been displaced by other, more bellicose ones: the clash of civilizations, the war on terrorism, and their constant companion: the Revolution in Military Affairs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Development
Political Geography:
United States

23. The Iraqi election "bait and switch": Faulty poll will not bring peace or US withdrawal

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
President Bush was correct when he asserted on 2 December 2004 that it was "time for the Iraqi citizens to go to the polls." Indeed, it is long past time. Elections should have occurred a year or so after the fall of the Hussein regime. But the fact that they are overdue does not mean that an adequate foundation for meaningfully democratic elections has been laid. It has not. Unfortunately, the balloting due to take place on 30 January will not fulfill the promise of democracy nor satisfy the Iraqi passion for selfdetermination. For these reasons, it cannot bring peace. It is more likely to exacerbate civil strife.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

24. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Progress toward a stable peace in Iraq and the withdrawal of US troops begins with the painful recognition that America's recent troubles are largely self-inflicted. This is due principally to the adoption of mission objectives that far exceed what is necessary or pragmatic.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Middle East

25. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The key to enabling total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels and with Iraq's neighbors - especially Syria and Iran. The proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for the insurgency, inside and outside the country. This would allow the United States to shift resources to the training mission and to adopt other de-escalatory measures - most importantly: a withdrawal time line. The strategic price of this diplomatic initiative would be a return to self-governance in Sunni areas, a guaranteed level of representation for these areas in the national assembly, an end to broad-brush measures of de-Baathification, an amnesty for most indigenous insurgents and for most former Baathists, and a de-escalation of the US confrontation with Syria and Iran regarding a range of issues. In conjunction with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States would announce a tentative time line for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq -- associated with training milestones. Also: US forces would end major offensive sweeps inside the country, adopt a defensive posture, and shift the emphasis of their activity to training Iraqi security forces. Finally: the Iraqi government would re-activate portions of the old army -- partly as a confidence-building measure, but also in order to (i) rob insurgent organizations of their recruiting base, (ii) augment the power of the new Iraqi security forces, and (iii) produce a better ethnic balance in the new forces (which are currently dominated by Kurds and Shiites). As new forces increase in capacity, US forces would be removed, further reducing a stimulus of insurgent action. Four hundred days - 57 weeks - is sufficient time to complete several Iraqi training cycles, including field exercises for many units at the battalion and brigade levels. Some division level training also can occur. Given sufficient resources (24,000 training personnel), 100,000 Iraqi security personnel can receive remedial training and another 80,000 new personnel can be trained and exercised during this period. Together with the full provision of all appropriate equipment, this development effort can yield Iraqi security forces that are several times more capable than those it controls in mid-2005. After thirteen months, the only foreign military assets remaining in Iraq would be a small monitoring and training mission with a security detail: less than 10,000 foreign civilian and military personnel in all. US troops should constitute no more than one-third of the military component -- that is, approximately 2,000 troops. This mission should be conducted under a three-year UN mandate and joint NATO-international command. In addition, the United States might maintain a 25,000-person rapid reaction task force in the region, but outside either Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

26. Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a "New Warfare

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Among those endeavors that a state or a people may undertake, none is more terrible than war. None has repercussions more far-reaching or profound. Thus, a grave responsibility to one's own nation and to the global community attends any decision to go to war. And part of this responsibility is to estimate and gauge the effects of war, including the collateral damage and civilian casualties that it incurs.
Topic:
Defense Policy and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, and Middle East

27. The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
10-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The motivating premise of this study is that nations cannot wage war responsibly or intelligently without careful attention to its costs. The broader context in which "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was conducted -- that is, the campaign against terrorism -- makes attention to the repercussions of war even more urgent. Effective action against terrorism depends in fair part on an effort to win hearts and minds. Success in this effort turns significantly on issues of legitimacy and responsible action, especially with regard to the use of force. And the first principle of responsible action is to take account of its effects.
Topic:
Human Welfare and War
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

28. Catastrophic Interdiction: Air Power and the Collapse of the Iraqi Field Army in the 2003 War

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
This report analyzes an important aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): the interdiction of Iraqi ground units by coalition air forces. Based on air campaign statistics, observations from the field, and the experience of past air campaigns, the report assesses the likely impact (in terms of combatant casualties) of coalition air attacks on the Iraqi army in the field. Our approach is a comparative one that views the OIF air interdiction campaign in light of the experience of the 1991 Gulf War. Among the issues we explore is the contribution of coalition air power to the catastrophic collapse of the Iraqi Republican Guard and regular army.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East