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1. An Undisciplined Defense: Understanding the $2 Trillion Surge in US Defense Spending

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The rise in US defense spending since 1998 has no precedent in all the years since the Korean war. It most readily compares with two earlier, but lesser spending surges: the 1958-1968 surge of 43% and the 1975-1985 surge of 57%. The post-Cold War retrenchment of the US military reached its limit in 1998 with DoD's budget settling at an ebb point of $361.5 billion (2010 USD). If we treat the 1998 budget level as a “baseline” and project it forward to 2010 (adjusting for inflation), we find that the total amount of funds that have been given to DoD above this level during the years 1999-2010 is $2.15 trillion (in 2010 dollars). This figure constitutes what we call the post-1998 spending surge. (All told, DoD budget authority for the period was $6.5 trillion in 2010 dollars).
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and War
Political Geography:
United States

2. 9/11 and the Paradox of American Power

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs
Abstract:
The September 2001 attacks on the United States facilitated the formation of an effective domestic consensus on post-Cold War US globalism – a goal that had eluded the Clinton administration. The centerpiece of that consensus is the "war on terrorism." This puts US global engagement in a "war-fighting" framework, which has strong institutional, cultural, and ideological resonances in the American polity. And it admits both neo-conservative and neo-liberal varieties. However, the attendant surge in US military activism has proved both fabulously expensive and largely counter-productive. Moreover, it has helped undermine America's already-troubled hegemonic position within the Western and allied camp.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States and America

3. America Speaks Out: Is the United States spending too much on defense?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
03-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
On 1-4 February 2007, the Gallup polling organization asked a representative sample of US citizens if they thought the United States was spending too little, too much, or just the right amount on defense and the military.{1} For the first time since the mid-1990s, a plurality of Americans said that the country was spending too much. The surprising result of the survey shows current public attitudes to approximate those that prevailed in March 1993, shortly after former President Bill Clinton took office. Today, 43 percent of Americans say that the country is spending “too much” on the military, while 20 percent say “too little”. In 1993, the balance of opinion was 42 percent saying “too much” and 17 percent saying too little.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and War
Political Geography:
United States and America

4. More Troops for Iraq? Time to just say "No"

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Few outside the administration would contest that the mission's “measurables” are miserable. The progress in Iraq reconstruction has been glacial and the security situation has steadily deteriorated, despite a great expenditure of time, money, and lives. But why? Critics have variously targeted the administration's strategy, planning, priorities, and level of effort – which suggest that there might be a better way. And, indeed, the administration now claims to have discovered one.
Topic:
Defense Policy and War
Political Geography:
United States and Iraq

5. No good reason to boost Army, Marine Corps end strength

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
President Bush's request to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 personnel follows on the heels of similar proposals by Congress members of both parties. Despite the bipartisan appeal of this idea, it is not at all clear what problem it is intended to solve or how it is supposed to solve it. Advocates may believe that America's troubles in Iraq provide reason enough to “grow” the Army and Marine Corps. But this view misconstrues both the lessons of that war and America's true security needs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, and War
Political Geography:
Iraq and America

6. Fighting on Borrowed Time: The effect on US military readiness of America's post-9/11 wars

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Considerable controversy surrounds the effects of America's post-9/11 wars on its armed forces – more specifically, their effects on military readiness. And there are grounds enough for concern in the August 2006 admission by General Peter Pace, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, that two-thirds of the US Army's active and reserve combat brigades registered in the two lowest readiness categories.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, and War
Political Geography:
United States and America

7. War and Consequences: Global terrorism has increased since 9/11 attacks

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Since the onset of the US “global war on terrorism”, the operational capacity of the original “Al Qaeda” centered around Osama bin-Laden has been significantly degraded. Hundreds of cadre formerly commanded by bin-Laden have been killed (mostly during the Afghan war). Several top leaders of the organization have been killed or captured – most notably Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – as have several leading regional associates, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Dozens of third tier operatives have been killed or captured. Nonetheless, the organization continues to function in a more decentralized form.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States

8. QDR 2006: Do the forces match the mission? DOD gives little reason to believe

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
As originally conceived the Quadrennial Defense Review was meant to help ensure the internal consistency of mid-and longer-term US defense planning. By “internal consistency” I here mean a concordance of strategy, assets, and budgets. As critics often put it in the past: the point is to show how the force fits the strategy and the budget fits the force. The exercise is supposed to “connect” our military strategy with our force development plans and, in turn, connect these with current and future budgets. In this regard, the 2006 QDR is long on assertion and short on quantification – “short” as in utterly lacking.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and War
Political Geography:
United States

9. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Progress toward a stable peace in Iraq and the withdrawal of US troops begins with the painful recognition that America's recent troubles are largely self-inflicted. This is due principally to the adoption of mission objectives that far exceed what is necessary or pragmatic.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Middle East

10. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The key to enabling total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels and with Iraq's neighbors - especially Syria and Iran. The proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for the insurgency, inside and outside the country. This would allow the United States to shift resources to the training mission and to adopt other de-escalatory measures - most importantly: a withdrawal time line. The strategic price of this diplomatic initiative would be a return to self-governance in Sunni areas, a guaranteed level of representation for these areas in the national assembly, an end to broad-brush measures of de-Baathification, an amnesty for most indigenous insurgents and for most former Baathists, and a de-escalation of the US confrontation with Syria and Iran regarding a range of issues. In conjunction with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States would announce a tentative time line for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq -- associated with training milestones. Also: US forces would end major offensive sweeps inside the country, adopt a defensive posture, and shift the emphasis of their activity to training Iraqi security forces. Finally: the Iraqi government would re-activate portions of the old army -- partly as a confidence-building measure, but also in order to (i) rob insurgent organizations of their recruiting base, (ii) augment the power of the new Iraqi security forces, and (iii) produce a better ethnic balance in the new forces (which are currently dominated by Kurds and Shiites). As new forces increase in capacity, US forces would be removed, further reducing a stimulus of insurgent action. Four hundred days - 57 weeks - is sufficient time to complete several Iraqi training cycles, including field exercises for many units at the battalion and brigade levels. Some division level training also can occur. Given sufficient resources (24,000 training personnel), 100,000 Iraqi security personnel can receive remedial training and another 80,000 new personnel can be trained and exercised during this period. Together with the full provision of all appropriate equipment, this development effort can yield Iraqi security forces that are several times more capable than those it controls in mid-2005. After thirteen months, the only foreign military assets remaining in Iraq would be a small monitoring and training mission with a security detail: less than 10,000 foreign civilian and military personnel in all. US troops should constitute no more than one-third of the military component -- that is, approximately 2,000 troops. This mission should be conducted under a three-year UN mandate and joint NATO-international command. In addition, the United States might maintain a 25,000-person rapid reaction task force in the region, but outside either Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East