Search

Begin New Search Political Geography North America Author Bryan Clark

11. Advancing Decision-Centric Warfare: Gaining Advantage Through Force Design and Mission Integration

Author:
Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Advancements in digital communication and virtualization are creating opportunities and challenges for integrating military capabilities similar to those associated with the emerging Internet of Things. Contemporary discussion in the Department of Defense (DoD) frames the military use case for integration as multi-domain operations, in which capabilities from different services and operating environments are combined to achieve a common objective. However, this paradigm merely perpetuates long-standing approaches to joint operations and misses the fundamental shift underway toward the centrality of information and decision-making in warfare. Attrition is receding as a mechanism to achieve national security objectives as computing and communication innovations enable military forces to gain a decision-making advantage through capability arrangement and orchestration that improves their own adaptability and creates uncertainty for opponents. To exploit this emerging opportunity, commanders in the field will need the ability to identify and implement new force combinations, communications paths, and courses of action. This report describes a new model for joint force design and integration, where elements of military capability are able to be composed and tailored to the needs of specific operational challenges close to the time of use. Combined with appropriate command and control processes and systems, this model of mission integration has the potential to provide military advantage against capable adversaries through the surprise generated from force composition and recombination. Mission integration could also reduce the cost of operations and modernization by enabling aggregation of less-expensive weapons systems to realize capabilities provided today by large multimission platforms or formations. However, institutional challenges will hinder implementation of mission integration. The plodding, supply-side processes of the Department of Defense are built on predictability and homogeneity of forces, in which weapon system performance and quantity are critical parameters. Supply-focused capability development and integration worked when the US military was broadly superior to its potential opponents following the Cold War. Today, US forces face peer competitors and must adopt more agile approaches to deliver and deploy capabilities. In addition to supply-side improvements in interoperability and decision-support tools to recompose forces, achieving mission-tailored adaptability will require demand-side customization of military capabilities such as radio waveforms, sensor packages, decision aids, warhead characteristics, or electromagnetic warfare algorithms to address evolving threats. Unfortunately, the Pentagon’s centralized industrial base and forecast-centric requirements and budgeting processes do not afford the flexibility to deliver this kind of heterogeneity at scale. This study uses an operational challenge vignette to describe a plausible pathway to implement mission integration that illustrates how clever and sustained force recomposition could fundamentally alter an adversary’s strategic calculus without developing a new weapon system. The vignette and associated analysis highlight specific recommendations for the Department of Defense to fund and explore the concept of mission integration, and to take an evolutionary approach to modernizing its institutional processes to exploit the opportunities afforded by changing technology and the emerging character of warfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

12. Regaining the Digital Advantage: A Demand-Focused Strategy for US Microelectronics Competitiveness

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Microprocessors are a critical element of US national infrastructure and manage the country’s energy grids, transportation systems, and telecommunications networks. Without a reliable supply of computer chips and microelectronic components, most US economic and societal activity would grind to a halt. The semiconductor manufacturing process is largely concentrated in East Asia, where manufacturers could be subjected to pressure or coercion by the People’s Republic of China. The semiconductor supply chain, and its inherent resilience and security, could be strengthened by US government investment to bring more steps of the microelectronics production and assembly process onto US shores. To guide government policies, this study proposes a four-factor framework measured from the perspective of the US microelectronics customers and industry. These factors include: resilience of continued microelectronics supplies to the US market; assurance that US microelectronics reflect their intended design and are free of security vulnerabilities; the ability of the US microelectronics industry to meet current microelectronics demand, which shapes the ecosystem; and the value added from US firms, which supports future demand.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Sustaining the Undersea Advantage: Transforming Anti-Submarine Warfare Using Autonomous Systems

Author:
Bryan Clark, Seth Cropsey, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Submarines have posed a challenge to naval forces for more than a century, enabling weaker maritime powers to launch surprise attacks ashore or cut an opponent off from the sea. But submarine threats, and the difficulty of countering them, increased substantially for the United States and its allies during the past decade. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is modernizing its fleet with conventional air-independent propulsion submarines (SSPs) that support its broader sensor and weapon networks. It is also fielding nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) capable of longer or more distant deployments. New generations of Russian Federation Navy (RFN) SSNs are difficult to track and could be employed for conventional or nuclear strikes during a conflict. Both countries are augmenting their submarine fleets with large autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) incorporating submarine like capabilities. Modern submarine technology has also proliferated, with the North Korean and Iranian navies using submarines and AUVs to level the playing field with their larger regional competitors and the United States. Unfortunately, the current US and allied approach to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is unlikely to cope with the probable scale of undersea threats in a crisis or conflict. US Navy ASW concepts rely on fixed seabed sensors such as the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) or Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships to detect and initially track submarines. Multiple maritime patrol aircraft and guided missile destroyers (DDGs) then track each adversary submarine before potentially passing it to an SSN for longerterm surveillance. This approach works when opposing submarines deploy infrequently but is likely to break down during a large-scale submarine deployment or as submarines become quieter and harder to track. When manned platforms and expendables such as sonobuoys or torpedoes run out or are needed elsewhere, ASW operations will necessarily collapse to a defensive strategy protecting high-value targets, instead of suppressing enemy submarine operations closer to the adversary’s waters. This may result in unlocated adversary submarines operating in the open ocean, where they could threaten US and allied shipping and maritime operations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Maritime, Automation, and Submarines
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. Weaponizing the 5G Value Chain

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
US national security experts worry the United States is falling behind China in the competition for 5G mobile communication dominance. While US companies led establishment of today’s 4G networks, they are not the frontrunners in setting 5G standards, building 5G equipment, or deploying 5G infrastructure. The lead in 5G implementation belongs instead to China’s Huawei, which exploited a combination of regulatory protection, government subsidies, and capable technology to rapidly gain one-third of the global 5G market.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America