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1. National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement

Author:
Milada Anna Vachudova and Andrew Moravcsik
Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
Abstract:
The EU enlargement process and its consequences are decisively influenced by material national interests and state power. Current EU leaders promote accession primarily because they believe it to be in their longterm economic and geopolitical interest, and applicant states embark on the laborious accession process because EU membership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits, particularly as compared exclusion as others move forward. As in previous rounds of EU enlargement, patterns of asymmetrical interdependence dictate that the applicants compromise more on the margin—thereby contributing to a subjective sense of loss among those countries (the applicants) that benefit most. Domestic distributional conflict is exacerbated everywhere, but the losses are in most cases limited, inevitable and, in the longer term, even beneficial. Once in, we should expect applicant states, like their predecessors, to deploy their voting and veto power in an effort to transfer resources to themselves. While overrepresentation of smaller states gives the applicants an impressive number of votes, the lack of new “grand projects” essential to existing members, the diversity of the new members, and above all, the increasingly flexible decision-making structure of the EU, will make it difficult for the new members to prevail.
Topic:
International Political Economy and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

2. On Democracy and the “Public Interest”: in the European Union

Author:
Andrew Moravcsik and Andrea Sangiovanni
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
Abstract:
Perhaps the most fundamental question in contemporary European Union politics is whether the existing division and sharing of competences between national and supranational levels is pragmatically and normatively justifiable. In his classic book, Governing in Europe (1999), Fritz Scharpf argues that the current policy mix is sub-optimal and, therefore, democratically illegitimate, because the multi-level European polity lacks the 'problem-solving capacity' necessary to permit citizens and their representatives to bargain to optimal outcomes. Instead it is likely to trigger a vicious circle of downward adaptations in social policy and public services that are likely to sap the EU's support. Scharpf recommends granting domestic social welfare policies constitutional status in EU jurisprudence, and permitting 'differentiated integration' or 'flexibility' for high-standard countries to legislate as an EU sub-group. In this challenge by Scharpf to the 'output legitimacy' of the EU, we argue, a number of important issues remain unresolved. First, his argument rests on an implicit and insufficiently elaborated conception of the public interest in maintaining or expanding current patterns of social welfare protection. Second, any effort to specify this 'public interest' must address three fundamental problems of democratic theory, namely the status of uninformed or inexpert citizens, underlying biases in democratic representation, and proper scope of majoritarian decision-making. Third, and fully in the spirit of the concerns raised in Governing in Europe, we suggest two possible strategies for addressing these concerns and some tools for rethinking output legitimacy and its relation both to the 'public interest' and to participatory procedures. The research agenda on democratic legitimacy in Europe launched by Scharpf is likely to be a lively one for some time to come.
Topic:
Democratization and Government
Political Geography:
Europe

3. In Defense of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union

Author:
Andrew Moravcsik
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
Abstract:
Concern about the EU's 'democratic deficit' is misplaced. Judged against prevailing standards in existing advanced industrial democracies, rather than those of an ideal plebiscitary or parliamentary democracy, the EU is democratically legitimate. Its institutions are tightly constrained by constitutional checks and balances: narrow mandates, fiscal limits, super-majoritarian and concurrent voting requirements and separation of powers. There is little evidence that the EU impacts an unjustifiable neo-liberal bias on EU policy. The apparently disproportionate insulation of EU institutions reflects the subset of functions they perform – central banking, constitutional adjudication, civil prosecution, economic diplomacy and technical administration – which are matters of low electoral salience commonly delegated in national systems, for normatively justifiable reasons. Efforts to expand participation in the EU, even if successful, are thus unlikely to greatly expand meaningful deliberation. On balance, the EU redresses rather than creates biases in political representation, deliberation and output.
Topic:
Democratization and Government
Political Geography:
Europe