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Begin New Search Author Aila M. Matanock Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Elite Political Cues and Attitude Formation in Post-Conflict Contexts

Author:
Natalia Garbiras-Díaz, Miguel García-Sánchez, and Aila M. Matanock
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
Citizens are often asked to evaluate peace agreements seeking to end civil conflicts, by voting on referendums or the negotiating leaders or, even when not voting, deciding whether to cooperate with the implementation of policies like combatant reintegration. In this paper, we assess how citizens form attitudes towards the provisions in peace agreements. These contexts tend to have high polarization, and citizens are asked to weigh in on complex policies, so we theorize that citizens will use cues from political elites with whom they have affinity, and, without these cues, information will have less effect. We assess our theory using survey experiments in Colombia. We find citizens rely on political elites’ cues to form their opinion on a peace agreement’s provisions, with the direction depending on the citizen’s affinity with the political elites. Additional information about these policies has little effect. The paper suggests that even these high stakes decisions can be seen as political decisions as usual.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, Citizenship, Conflict, Peace, and Elites
Political Geography:
Colombia and Latin America

2. Does Counterinsurgent Success Match Social Support? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Colombia

Author:
Aila M. Matanock and Miguel García-Sánchez
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
Dominant theories of counterinsurgency suggest that state forces must win over citizens to identify insurgents among them. Yet even where state forces are losing, polling shows consistently strong support for counterinsurgents. How can we explain this discrepancy? It could be that the dominant theory of counterinsurgency is incorrect, or, as we posit, it could be that individuals systematically falsify their preferences. This study builds on the intuition that individuals may feel pressure and potentially fear that encourages them to report consistently strong support for the military when asked directly—even, perhaps especially, when they rely on an illegal organization or an illicit economy for their livelihood. We argue that this pressure decreases when individuals are asked indirectly, in a way that allows them to conceal their response. We thus assess whether support for the military is lower when measured indirectly than directly and whether the difference is more pronounced in areas of insurgent control. We test this theory of preference falsification, as well as its novel implications about spatial variation, by randomizing direct and indirect survey questions (a list experiment) in a face-to-face survey conducted across conflict contexts in Colombia.
Topic:
Development, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Military Affairs, Citizenship, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Colombia and Latin America

3. Learning to Share: Explaining the Conditions under Which States Delegate Governance

Author:
Aila M. Matanock
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
A potential solution for weak or failing states is to enact a delegation agreement whereby a host relinquishes authority over some governance function to an external actor. Through case studies in Melanesia, I find that these arrangements can be implemented as treaties, rather than contracts, so that the external actor remains somewhat exempt from the normal procedure or law of the host state. I also generate hypotheses about the conditions under which host states and external actors enact these self-enforcing equilibria: host states request these agreements either where a major law and order problem leads to a loss of monopoly on the use of force, or where extortion or corruption leads to budgetary crisis. External actors agree to them only under the latter circumstances since this makes the reputational and actual costs of the mission lower, as judged against alternative methods for resolving the problem, and where that state also poses a specific transnational security threat.
Topic:
Corruption, Debt, Fragile/Failed State, and Governance