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Begin New Search Publishing Institution European Research Papers Archive Author Adrienne Héritier

1. Codecision and Institutional Change

Author:
Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier
Publication Date:
12-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Research Papers Archive
Abstract:
We examine the sources and processes of institutional change in one important aspect of EU politics—the legislative procedure of codecision and show how interstitial change of institutions emerges between formal Treaty revisions and under specific conditions may be formalized in subsequent formal Treaty reforms. We develop two related models of Treaty change. First, in a'simple' model, we argue that informal rules will be formalized in the Treaty text where all member states are in agreement, and will be rolled back when all member states oppose them; otherwise they will continue in existence at the informal level. Second, in a more complex framework, we argue that actors who have effective veto powers in a related arena may make credible threats that allow them to press member states into formalizing informal rules, provided that member states are not unanimously opposed to this formalization. We empirically assess our claims in the light of several instances of informal rules applied in the codecision procedure.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union

Author:
Henry Farrell, Adrienne Héritier, and Carl-Fredrik Bergström
Publication Date:
12-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Research Papers Archive
Abstract:
In this article we explain how actors' ability to bargain successfully in order to advance their institutional preferences has changed over time as a function of the particular institutional context. We show how actors use their bargaining power under given institutional rules in order to shift the existing balance between legislation and delegation, and shift the rules governing delegation in their favour, between formal treaty changes. We argue that a collective actor's preferences over delegation is a function of whether the actor has more ability to influence policy through delegation or through legislation. We go on to argue that the degree to which a specific actor's preferences can prevail (in a setting in which different actors have different preferences) will depend upon its bargaining power under existing institutional rules, i.e. its ability to impede or veto policy in order to change the division between legislation and delegation and the rules of delegation. Our primary focus in this article is on choice over procedure; i.e. the battles over whether or not delegation or legislation should be employed. We maintain a secondary focus on change in procedure, examining how different procedures of comitology have come into being and been removed from the table. We examine the evolution of the debate over comitology and implementation, over five key periods. We scrutinize how actors within these periods seek to shift the balance of legislation and delegation and the rules of delegation according to their preferences. Our conclusions assess our empirical findings on the basis of our model.
Topic:
Development, Government, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe

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