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1. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Expertise

Author:
Karnamadakala Rahul Sharma, Aditya Unnikrishnan, and Sonakshi Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Historical accounts show that the education and training of the colonial civil servant was purposely made non-specialised. Autobiographical narratives of ICS officers who received their training at Halieybury (England), reveal that the quality of education was low and students were tested on their knowledge of languages such as Persian and Sanskrit, which had little practical use once they arrived in India. After the Service was made merit-based in 1853, officer training included more practical aspects such as attending court proceedings and writing reports, however, it did not involve in-depth specialisation in any one field. The non-specialised character of training and the expertise gained, were well suited to the nature of the polity that required district officials to hold multiple portfolios. Earl Cornwallis, the third Governor General of Bengal who is credited with making extensive changes in the civil service from 1793 to 1859, tried to differentiate the judicial and supervisory functions for land revenue assessment and collection. He created the office of the District Collector as a supervisory role to oversee collection of revenue from landholders, whereas the administration of law was to be the responsibility of a civil judge and magistrate. However, after the annexation of Awadh and the territorial expansion of the company, it proved impossible for a District Collector to separate their judicial and supervisory functions, particularly in the newly acquired territories (Cohn, 1987, p. 509). The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) we have today inherited this generalist notion of the civil servant from its predecessor, the ICS. Post-independence, even though different services were created to undertake specific responsibilities, the imagination of the expertise of the IAS officer continues to be organised around the principles of the colonial civil service. This has led many to argue that the skills and knowledge of the IAS were unsuited to the nature of polity and demands of governance (Administrative Reforms Commission, 1969). More than fifty years later, the same tension concerning the personnel involved in governance and the skills/ knowledge required for these roles persists. As a result, two fundamental questions are central to the debates on expertise in the country’s government. First: What kind of knowledge and expertise is most useful for administrators? This debate has frequently been framed as a choice between generalists and specialists. And second: How can this expertise be embedded in administration, particularly at senior levels? Two kinds of solutions dominate this discourse, one where internal mechanisms are restructured to make best use of existing internal talent (via domain assignment) and the other involving the recruitment of external experts (via lateral entry). This working paper delves into the detailed discussion on these two questions by reviewing the First and Second Administrative Reforms Commissions (ARC), Central Pay Commission Reports, the Surinder Nath Committee report, Sarkaria Commission report, NITI Three Year Action Agenda and Parliamentary Standing Committee reports. The first section of the working paper attempts to present a discursive overview of the generalist-specialist binary. The next two sections, on Domain Assignment and Lateral Entry respectively, explain the dominant approaches that have been considered to address the expertise problem. 2. Generalists vs Specialists: origins and tensions As with any job, there is consensus within the reform discourse that bureaucrats must display a high degree of ability and expertise. However, there are opposing views on what constitutes this expertise at the highest levels of the bureaucracy. These differences have frequently been expressed in the language of ‘generalists’ and ‘specialists’ partially as a result of the structure of India’s Civil Service which consists of generalist and specialist services as described in the next sub-section. The next two subsections throw light on the evolution of reform thinking on the kind of expertise needed—from narrow technical knowledge to domain competence, and eventually towards a more complex understanding that expertise is gained on the job that cannot be achieved through appropriate training alone. In the timeline on page 6, we present the sequence of events and reports of the last few decades that we consider salient for understanding the debate on generalist versus specialist roles. The timeline offers a bird’s eye view of reform trajectory when read alongside the detailed information provided in the following sections.
Topic:
History, Reform, Colonialism, and Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

2. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Performance Management

Author:
Aditya Unnikrishnan, Sonakshi Sharma, and Karnamadakala Rahul Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
In the early nineteenth century, a civil servant employed by the English East India Company had a considerable amount of autonomy. On the one hand, their actions could be questioned at the following levels: regional, provincial, at the Presidency, in London at the Court of Directors, the Board of Control and ultimately at parliament. However, as historians have noted, “given the difficulties of communication and the sheer bulk of information and correspondence which had to pass between India and London, it often took two or three years for matters originating in a district to be commented on in London” (Cohn, 1987, p. 512). In such a scenario, monitoring and measuring the performance of civil servants was particularly challenging. Accounts of civil servants have not yet been analysed to understand on what basis they were picked for promotion by their superiors or the Governor General. This changed postindependence, when clear processes were put in place for measuring performance, and performance appraisals were at the core of this shift. Measuring, reporting, and rewarding performance appropriately are critical for motivating and developing people’s capabilities across organisations and professions. In the public sector, for example, a recent survey of 23,000 civil servants in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America finds that “civil servants are more satisfied, committed and, at times, motivated to serve the public, work hard and perform, where they perceive that performance shapes their pay, promotion and job stability prospects” (Sahling et al., 2018, p. 36). However, measuring and rewarding performance in the public sector can be challenging because government employment often lacks the classic drivers and incentives that foster performance in other organisations. Employees in government and public sector organisations function in the absence of clear profit motives or market competition, which other organisations use to measure and reward performance (Moriarty & Kennedy, 2002). Government employees also have to contend with multiple ‘principals’, such as politicians, bureaucrats and the citizen population, each of whom have differing objectives. Measuring performance and linking it to multiple outcomes in such contexts can be complex (Pollitt, 1986). Finally, most civil service contracts have strong protections against dismissal, which severely limits the incentive tools available to managers in the private and nonprofit sectors (Esteve and Schuster, 2019). The design or assessment of performance appraisal systems in the public sector, therefore, need to consider these boundary conditions seriously. This working paper examines reforms related to the design of performance appraisals in the Indian Civil Services. Within the Indian government and especially senior administrative roles, performance appraisals have served as the primary tool by which employee performance is assessed and rewarded. This system, established in 1985, was meant to assess and rate officers annually against ex ante targets set at the beginning of the year (Surinder Nath Committee, 2002). By linking performance to career advancement, appraisals sought to motivate and incentivise better performance by government employees. Weaknesses in this appraisal process have, however, severely limited its impact on performance, requiring the government to undertake multiple reforms over the years.
Topic:
Reform, Management, Performance Evaluation, Civil Servants, and Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

3. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Training

Author:
Sonakshi Sharma, Aditya Unnikrishnan, and Karnamadakala Rahul Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Since Independence, the government’s approach to training the IAS has undergone a sea of change. The IAS has evolved “from being a postcolonial civil service… to one that is rooted in the empirical realities of a developing and resurgent India” (Kiran Aggarwal Committee, 2014, p.1). Training programmes for the IAS have shifted their focus from regulation to socioeconomic development in keeping with the new demands faced by governance and administration (Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008). In spite of these changes, there remain similarities with the colonial civil service. Like the ICS, the IAS is a high-functional generalist service tasked with handling a variety of responsibilities. Reform committees continue to express concerns that trainees do not attach adequate value to the training process (Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008). Training is still expected to create strong bonds between officers and establish a camaraderie. Most importantly, the central principle remains the same; a merit-based process is used to select young people with little or no experience in governance and place them in positions of great responsibility. This kind of system inevitably relies heavily on training to impart skills. Better training, both at the formative and mid-career stages, is expected to bridge the “wide chasm between public expectation and service delivery” (Kiran Aggarwal Committee, 2014, p. 3). For this reason, it is vital to examine the history of reform debates and conversations on the subject. Tracing the evolution of these reform threads will better equip us to analyse current and future reform measures by understanding which problems are being addressed and how. To this end, this working paper closely reads the following: the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) reports, Central Pay Commission (CPC) reports, and reports produced by reform commissions like the Alagh Committee, Kiran Aggarwal Committee, Hota Committee, Kothari Committee, Yugandhar Committee, VT Krishnamachari Committee and the Surinder Nath Committee. Apart from this, the working paper also draws on theNational Training Policy, 1996 and2012, and documents on Mission Karmayogi that reflect the government’s vision for IAS training. This paper begins with a short description of the current training format and the IAS ecosystem. This is followed by an analysis of the three streams that dominate reform thinking on IAS training: the strategy, structure and content of training; the role of and need for incentives in training programmes, and the institutional apparatus in place to operationalise training programmes.
Topic:
History, Reform, Colonialism, Training, Civil Servants, and Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India